No infrastructure project in the region can take place without Turkey’s approval or involvement, according to Ankara’s core narrative communicated to key regional players and interested global powers.
Recent developments are reshaping dynamics across the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle. From Israeli election outcomes to US-Russia outreach efforts and destabilisation from open conflict zones, regional powers are recalibrating their strategic planning.
Taking advantage of the shifting geopolitical environment, Ankara relies on military force, threats, and counter-incentives to disrupt Greek and Cypriot initiatives. Strategic moves such as the illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum aim to consolidate Turkey’s presence and expand its influence, affecting both Athens and neighbouring states like Egypt.
The occupying power is operating within a set framework and shows no intention of backing down. Ankara remains determined to protect its “Blue Homeland” vision while attempting to highlight its overall strategic value. In practice, Turkey’s stance presents regional operators with a choice: involve Ankara in planning and execution or face obstruction, currently pursued through aggressive rhetoric.
In diplomatic discussions with third parties, Turkish officials routinely cite past maritime interventions to reinforce their claims:
First, the July 2024 incident near Kasos and Karpathos, where Turkish warships blocked the Italian-flagged vessel Ievoli Relume as it conducted survey work for the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) electricity cable linking Crete and Cyprus.
Second, the February 2018 standoff off Cyprus just days before presidential elections, when Turkish frigates blocked the Saipem 12000 drillship leased by Italian energy firm ENI from reaching the “Soupia” target in Block 3 of the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Third, the July 2013 harassment of the survey vessel Odin Finder by a Turkish missile boat southwest of Cyprus near Blocks 1 and 7 while laying cables for CYTA.
In each instance, Turkey cited alleged violations of its continental shelf. Claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the entire Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara insists all maritime operations require prior diplomatic notification. While framed as administrative coordination to avoid operational conflicts and ensure safety, the demand aims to legitimise illegal territorial claims and stop projects that conflict with Turkish interests.
Despite Turkish threats, sea survey work for the Great Sea Interconnector is expected to resume amid renewed administrative momentum. The restart will test all parties involved. Turkey claims it must receive written notification because the cable path crosses its claimed maritime jurisdiction, a position rejected by regional authorities who note the Crete-to-Cyprus route does not pass through Turkish waters.
Simultaneously, the Republic of Cyprus reached a major energy milestone last Monday by signing contracts worth between $1.3 billion and $1.8 billion with Italian energy giant ENI in Nicosia. The contracts cover infrastructure development for the “Cronos” gas field inside the Cypriot EEZ, developed jointly with France’s TotalEnergies. Commercial exploitation will export Cypriot natural gas via Egypt, with initial production and shipments to Europe and international markets scheduled for 2028. The involvement of the Franco-Italian consortium alongside Egypt significantly reinforces Cyprus’s energy framework as long-delayed plans move into active implementation.
Turkey challenged the legal basis of the development, claiming publicly that licensing relies on a unilateral Greek Cypriot framework that ignores Turkish Cypriot rights. Ankara regularly uses the long-standing claim to oppose Republic of Cyprus energy developments.
At the same time, Turkey is pressing Egypt to align on maritime boundaries despite Cairo’s condemnation of the Libyan parliament’s ratification of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum. The condemnation followed a joint statement by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union, read outside the UN Security Council in New York by Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis alongside permanent representatives of the signatory nations.
Undeterred, Ankara offered Cairo an additional 15,000 square kilometres of EEZ coverage if Egypt agrees to a bilateral maritime border deal. The offer reflects Ankara’s broader pattern of claiming maritime areas belonging to neighboring states and offering them to third parties.
Cairo remains concerned by Turkey’s actions in Libya, including its military presence, involvement in infrastructure projects, and expanding influence. Turkish firms maintain a heavy commercial footprint in Libya and have taken on military-related projects, including a runway near the Egyptian border.
Egyptian officials are also closely monitoring Ankara’s attempts to mediate between eastern and western Libyan military factions. Recent talks hosted in Ankara involving military officials and diplomats failed to secure a deal. Turkish mediation aims to guarantee its presence following any eventual agreement, while Washington also supports Libyan military and political unification to curb destabilising external influences.
While open to selective engagement with Ankara, Egypt is expanding communication channels with Algeria and Tunisia, as all three nations view Turkish actions in Libya as a direct threat to regional stability.
During a recent UN exchange with Greek Permanent Representative Aglaia Balta following Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s address, Turkey’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Ahmet Yildiz, renewed President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s call for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference. The Turkish representative again cited the rights of Turkish Cypriots and the breakaway entity in northern Cyprus.
Erdogan reiterated the conference proposal during his address to the UN General Assembly last September, presenting it as a platform for regional dialogue. Ankara maintains the proposal to reopen maritime boundary arrangements established by regional treaties while inserting the breakaway regime into international discussions.
