Three men, one world order: why Europe should fear being left out of the room

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Xi Jinping, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin prepare for unprecedented trilateral talks in Shenzhen, China this week. But behind the diplomatic language lies a more uncomfortable question: are the world’s major powers beginning to negotiate a new international order over Europe’s head?

The leaders are expected to discuss the safeguarding of world peace and the promotion of strategic stability. China has described the encounter as having “groundbreaking significance,” according to today’s Deutsche Weller report.

It certainly carries significance as for the first time, the leaders of the United States, China and Russia are expected to sit together in a trilateral format.

Three nuclear superpowers, three competing visions of global order and three governments with enormous influence over international security. But why is Europe not in that room?

Peace on whose terms?

Nuclear disarmament is expected to be high on the agenda. Washington wants Beijing involved in future arms-control arrangements, particularly following the expiry of the last US-Russia nuclear arms-control treaty in February 2026. China, however, has traditionally argued that Washington and Moscow must first reduce their substantially larger arsenals before Beijing commits to negotiations.

The world has little to gain from another nuclear arms race, and communication between the three largest nuclear powers is essential to reducing the risk of catastrophic miscalculation.

Iran and the wider Middle East could also feature in discussions. President Trump has indicated that ending the conflict with Iran is among his priorities, while Beijing has sought to position itself as a diplomatic interlocutor in the region.

But there is another, potentially more consequential issue: Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not an abstract geopolitical disagreement. It is a war against a sovereign European country, with direct consequences for the continent’s security, borders and political stability. Yet reports suggest Ukraine may not feature prominently in the discussions, despite Moscow’s interest in securing a settlement favourable to the Kremlin.

This ambiguity concerns the European Union as any settlement negotiated between Washington, Moscow and Beijing, without Kyiv’s meaningful participation, would risk legitimising territorial conquest. Peace cannot mean rewarding the aggressor while asking the invaded country to accept the consequences.

Europe caught between Washington, Beijing and Moscow

The European Union finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position as it remains deeply connected to the United States, economically and militarily, while confronting Russia’s aggression and managing an increasingly complicated relationship with China.

The economic figures illustrate Europe’s exposure and according to the Council of the EU, transatlantic trade in goods and services exceeded €1.77 trillion in 2025. The relationship remains indispensable, despite growing political tensions across the Atlantic.

China is equally important with EU-China trade in goods and services exceeded €880 billion in 2025. Yet the relationship is increasingly unbalanced: the EU recorded a goods trade deficit of approximately €360 billion with China.

Europe therefore cannot afford to treat either Washington or Beijing as an expendable partner, at the same time it cannot afford to become dependent on their political goodwill.

The relationship with Russia is more straightforward, but no less dangerous. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe’s security environment, forcing governments to reconsider decades of assumptions about defence, deterrence and dependence on American military protection.

Europe: an economic giant, a geopolitical bystander

There is a danger that Europe will find itself caught between three capitals that increasingly see international relations as a matter of bilateral transactions and strategic bargains.

Brussels has considerable economic weight, regulatory influence and diplomatic reach and together with the US they represent almost 30% of global trade in goods and services. The EU and China account for a similar share, demonstrating that Europe is not a marginal international actor.

Latest figures from the European Commission indicate that in 2025, EU-US trade in goods and services reached approximately €1.77 trillion, while trade between the EU and China exceeded €880 billion. Together, these relationships represent more than €2.65 trillion in annual trade. Europe is an economic powerhouse with enormous stakes in both relationships.

But economic strength does not automatically translate into geopolitical power. Fragmentation between member states, dependence on external security guarantees and the difficulty of speaking with one voice continue to undermine European influence.

Europe’s strategic autonomy: independence without isolation

The challenge for Europe is not to choose between Washington, Beijing and Moscow, but to develop the capacity to engage with all three from a position of strength. This is the essence of European strategic autonomy: reducing critical dependencies without abandoning international partnerships.

In their research on European defence, Bruegel economists Guntram Wolff, Armin Steinbach and Jeromin Zettelmeyer identify fragmented procurement, insufficient coordination and reliance on American military capabilities as major obstacles to Europe’s strategic independence. Despite EU defence spending reaching an estimated €381 billion in 2025, higher budgets alone will not guarantee greater military readiness as they argue that the problem is also structural: Europe needs to turn national investments into shared capabilities.

Strategic autonomy, therefore, is not about distancing Europe from the US or confronting China but more about ensuring that the EU has the economic, military and diplomatic leverage to make its own decisions. Without greater coordination between member states, Europe risks remaining an economic powerhouse but a geopolitical outcast.

Europe must stop waiting for an invitation

The meeting between Xi, Trump and Putin is not inherently a threat since any positive progress on nuclear arms control, conflict prevention or a lasting settlement in Ukraine would clearly serve European interests as well. But the question is who gets to shape the agreements and who bears their consequences.

At the special European Council meeting of 6 March 2025, EU leaders established three clear principles: no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine, no negotiations affecting European security without Europe’s involvement, and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. These are not simply expressions of solidarity with Kyiv they aim to reflect the reality that the outcome of the war will determine Europe’s future security architecture.

Europe remains one of principal stakeholders of the Ukrainian defence machinery with continuous financial packages for Ukraine and as of 16 November 2026, the EU and its 27 member states have mobilised €235.9 billion in overall support for Ukraine and its people, according to the European Council. The growing consensus inside the EU is that the bloc should demand a seat at a table which could be consequential for its future security architecture.

(Sources: Deutsche Weller, European Commission, European Council, Bruegel)

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