For years, the European Union’s China policy has rested on an uncomfortable formulation: China is simultaneously a partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.
It was a useful description because it avoided the binary choice between embracing Beijing and confronting it. But the economic relationship is making that balancing act increasingly difficult.
“China is still one of the EU’s key trade partners: our largest source of imports and, after the US, our second-largest partner in goods trade. But the relationship has become asymmetric,” Dorothée Falkenberg, PhD researcher at KU Lueven told en.philenews.
The EU’s trade deficit in goods with China reached €359.9 billion in 2025, up 2.7 percent from the previous year. EU imports from China rose to €559.5 billion, while exports fell to €199.5 billion. China is now the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its second-largest trading partner for goods overall, according to the latest report from the European Commission.
That imbalance is the backdrop to a much more consequential phase in Brussels-Beijing relations.
The question for the EU is no longer simply whether it should trade with China. The real question is on what terms and with how much exposure to a country whose industrial capacity, export power and control over strategically important supply chains increasingly affect Europe’s own economic security.
The €1 billion-a-day problem
The scale of the imbalance explains the urgency in Brussels.
The European Commission states that the EU’s goods deficit with China increased from €312.2 billion in 2024 to €359.9 billion in 2025. At the same time, the EU maintains a surplus in services, worth €21.3 billion in 2025, although that surplus is declining.
The composition of the trade relationship matters too. Almost all EU imports from China, 97.3 percent in 2025, were manufactured goods. For example, machinery and vehicles alone represented 54.4 percent.
This is therefore not simply a story about cheap consumer goods entering Europe, but one increasingly about the competitiveness of European manufacturing itself creating an imbalance.
This “imbalance is part of the reason why China is now central to the EU’s economic-security thinking,” according to Falkenberg. “I wouldn’t call it an economic-security relationship. Economic security is not a relationship with any particular country but a broader, deliberately country-agnostic approach, with tools such as investment screening, foreign-subsidy controls and the Anti-Coercion Instrument that target practices, not countries,” she added.
From electric vehicles to rare earths
The electric vehicle dispute became the clearest demonstration of the EU’s new approach.
The Commission imposed definitive countervailing duties on Chinese battery-electric vehicles in 2024, ranging from 7.8 percent to 35.3 percent, but has simultaneously kept negotiating with Chinese producers for alternatives compatible with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. This February, the Commission accepted a price undertaking from Volkswagen Anhui covering the Cupra Tavascan produced in China. The arrangement included a minimum import price, limits on import volumes and commitments linked to investment in the EU.
What is evident is that the EU is trying to develop mechanisms that allow Chinese companies to remain in the European market while changing the conditions under which they compete. However, the bigger strategic problem lies in China’s control over critical raw materials which has turned trade dependence into a potential source of political leverage.
In 2025, the European Parliament warned about China’s export restrictions on rare earth elements and permanent magnets, which are important for automotive, energy and defence industries. Parliament called for diversification, stronger implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act and partnerships with alternative suppliers.
The vulnerability is measurable: according to Eurostat data carried by the Commission, China accounted for 46.8 percent of EU rare-earth imports by weight in 2025, making the EU-China relationship different from a conventional trade dispute. If Beijing can influence the availability of an input required by European factories, the issue is no longer only about tariffs or market access transforming it to an economic-security question.
Brussels tries dialogue while also keeping the weapons on the table
The EU’s answer so far has been neither decoupling nor unrestricted engagement.
In June, Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao launched Trade and Investment Consultations, built around four areas: trade and investment balancing, export controls, intellectual property rights and WTO reform. They also agreed to establish a mechanism to monitor trade flows.
The message from Brussels was therefore twofold, negotiate, but demonstrate that negotiations can produce results.
By September, this pressure had increased when Šefčovič speaking Euronews stated that China needed to deliver concrete results by October or there would be political pressure for tougher measures. The European Commission has also been working on diversification tools aimed at reducing European dependence on Chinese suppliers.
The next major test comes in October, with Šefčovič due to travel to Beijing for talks with Wang with the aim of examining the possibility of quotas or voluntary restrictions on some Chinese exports to Europe.
A negotiated quota could reduce pressure on particular European industries without requiring another round of unilateral tariffs. But it would also represent a move away from the EU’s traditional preference for market-based trade rules and could create questions about who decides which sectors deserve protection.
The problem with “de-risking”
According to the Commission de-risking is described as reducing critical dependencies and vulnerabilities while maintaining communication and cooperation with China.
European companies have invested heavily in China and the Commission puts the stock of EU investment there at €239.3 billion in 2024, contrary to Chinese investment stock in the EU which stood at €79.8 billion. This inevitably means that the European business relationship cannot simply be switched off, as China is both a huge consumer market and a critical manufacturing centre.
At the same time, the Commission says European companies continue to face market-access barriers in China, including regulatory restrictions, difficulties around data and cybersecurity, intellectual-property concerns and what it describes as a lack of a level playing field.
What does reciprocity mean?
The EU’s answer to these concerns has increasingly been to demand reciprocity.
The European Parliament said in July that a sustainable EU-China relationship requires reciprocity, a level playing field and trust, with MEPs again pointing to the EU’s growing trade deficit.
But reciprocity does not necessarily mean balancing the trade deficit euro for euro. It can mean better market access and more equal conditions for European companies competing in China.
Theo Storella, China Economic Security Consultant at Bruegel, told en.philenews that rebalancing could include Chinese voluntary export caps or price floors for products where excess Chinese capacity threatens European industry, particularly automobiles and chemicals.
“Realistically, rebalancing EU-China trade could take the form of voluntary export caps or price floors from China on certain products which threaten the EU’s industrial base, most notably for high-value added, high-employment items like automobiles and chemicals. In these cases, the Commission has already found that China is producing more than itself or the rest of the world can realistically consume in the near term, exporting the excess at prices which undercut EU producers,” he said.
“Further, a realistic achievement for EU-China rebalancing would involve finally building a more level playing field for foreign businesses to compete in China. Several challenges stand in the way of this, including China’s inefficient but highly effective industrial policy which gives preferential tax treatment, land sales, loans, grants, permitting, access to government procurement contracts, and legal recourse for business disputes to Chinese firms over foreign ones,” he added.
The geopolitical complication
Trade cannot be separated entirely from geopolitics, as demonstrated at the 2025 EU-China summit where the EU pressed Beijing on trade while also raising Russia’s war against Ukraine, climate cooperation and broader global issues. The summit statement described the trade relationship as critically unbalanced, with a goods deficit of €305 billion in 2024.
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) delegation returned to the issue in July 2026, linking economic imbalances with wider questions about Ukraine, human rights, multilateralism and security.
What is distinctly evident is that there are areas in which Europe needs China as a negotiating partner such as in climate issues, global trade rules and public health. However, in the corporate sector European companies will inevitably compete directly with Chinese firms.
And there are areas, from critical technologies to supply chains, where European policymakers increasingly see dependence itself as a vulnerability.
So what kind of relationship?
There are essentially three models on the table, the first being engagement. That entails maintaining deep economic ties, negotiate disputes and resist turning trade policy into economic confrontation.
The second is managed de-risking: preserve substantial trade and investment while systematically reducing dependence in critical sectors, diversifying supply chains and using trade-defence tools where the EU identifies unfair competition.
The third is strategic economic defence: accept greater costs to European consumers and companies in return for stronger protection of domestic industrial capacity and greater control over critical supply chains.
None comes without costs.
Engagement risks leaving Europe exposed if market asymmetries and dependencies continue to widen, while de-risking requires difficult choices about what is actually critical and how much diversification European companies can afford. The more defensive strategy could protect particular industries while making European products or inputs more expensive and inviting retaliation from Beijing.
For Falkenberg, the EU has increasingly recognised the China challenge, but still lacks the coordination to use its growing toolbox strategically. Storella, meanwhile, argues that Europe should look beyond China’s export strength to the domestic economic pressures driving it, including weak Chinese consumption and the country’s reliance on external demand.
Their assessments point to a challenge that goes well beyond tariffs or the headline trade deficit. Brussels can use trade defence to buy European industry time and push Beijing towards greater reciprocity, but neither will resolve the underlying vulnerabilities on their own.
The EU will also have to strengthen its industrial base, diversify critical supply chains and improve coordination between trade, economic-security and foreign policy. At the same time, it will need to recognise that China’s economic model is shaped by problems that Europe cannot solve for it.
The choice, therefore is whether Europe can remain open to Chinese trade and investment while becoming sufficiently resilient that it is not forced to choose between its economic interests and its strategic interests every time the relationship comes under pressure.
That may ultimately be the real test of the EU’s de-risking strategy.
(Sources: European Commission, European Parliament, Euronews)
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