AKEL has formally launched its preparations for the 2028 presidential election, with party leader Stefanos Stefanou making alliances with other political forces his top priority as the left-wing party seeks to break the political isolation it has faced since 2013.
The party’s Central Committee met last week to begin preliminary discussions, approving a broad political framework for building alliances and identifying a candidate to contest the election.
The key to AKEL’s strategy is cooperation with other parties. Stefanou has made securing political partnerships his overriding objective, primarily to bring the party out of the isolation it has experienced for more than a decade.
AKEL is now signalling its interest in specific political partners, reflecting a different assessment of the political landscape.
According to information obtained by Phileleftheros, Central Committee members were told that the prospects for cooperation had changed significantly compared with previous years.
Even the fact that AKEL is now finding parties willing to explore potential cooperation is considered an important development.
Whether this will eventually lead to a progressive political alliance bringing together AKEL, other parties, prominent individuals and sections of society remains uncertain.
But this is the main challenge facing the party. The outcome of these efforts, alongside other considerations, will largely determine whom AKEL chooses as its presidential candidate.
AKEL’s political courtship of Sofia and the Yasemides option
The change of leadership at EDEK has created a new political landscape. An informal political courtship has become increasingly apparent, with AKEL’s overtures towards EDEK and its new president at times bordering on a sustained campaign to win the party over.
EDEK’s new leadership, although still temporary, has brought a different political atmosphere to the party. That does not necessarily mean it will fundamentally change its political direction.
There has, however, been a shift in rhetoric, with greater emphasis on social issues. The use of the term “reunification” in EDEK’s statement marking the anniversary of Cyprus’s independence has also attracted attention.
These developments have raised hopes within AKEL that it could rebuild bridges with a party with which it traditionally cooperated and with which it shares common ground on economic and social policy.
Beyond that, an AKEL-EDEK electoral partnership would give greater substance to the idea of a “coalition of progressive forces”, the banner under which AKEL hopes to contest the presidential election while breaking out of its political isolation.
EDEK’s new leadership also appears aware of AKEL’s overtures. Public statements by AKEL officials, who have avoided criticising or attacking EDEK, have not gone unnoticed.
At the same time, there is dissatisfaction within EDEK towards President Nikos Christodoulides and the political circumstances that have developed following the latest cabinet reshuffle.
Messages repeatedly coming from EDEK’s party headquarters suggest that the party does not want to be taken for granted by anyone, although it remains open to discussions with all sides.
EDEK wants a more substantial role in politics, allowing it to influence developments in a manner consistent with its historical position.
It also wants a more meaningful role in government, given that it currently has no representation in the cabinet.
This is where the name of economist Tasos Yasemides continues to surface, although discussions remain entirely theoretical.
AKEL has not formally discussed potential candidates, and no names were raised at the Central Committee meeting. Nor has the party officially approached anyone about standing.
Yasemides himself left the possibility open when asked about it during a television appearance. His response suggested that he was not opposed to the idea and was comfortable with his name continuing to feature in presidential election speculation.
There have also been no official discussions with EDEK.
Nevertheless, Yasemides is certainly a possible candidate, particularly if AKEL and EDEK reach an agreement.
Such an outcome might even represent AKEL’s ideal scenario. Yasemides would be a strong candidate for the party even if efforts to secure EDEK’s support ultimately failed.
Could EDEK join forces with AKEL?
An alliance between EDEK and AKEL would be far from straightforward.
EDEK is currently aligned with the government. Although it no longer has a seat in the cabinet, its representatives still serve on the boards of semi-governmental organisations and hold commissioner positions.
Moreover, a substantial section of EDEK’s supporters, including figures involved in the initiative that backed its new leadership, remains sympathetic to Christodoulides.
Cooperation with AKEL would therefore carry considerable political risks.
EDEK would have to leave the governing camp, move into opposition and enter an alliance with a party that some believe could attract a substantial proportion of its own voters.
And what would happen if Christodoulides were re-elected?
EDEK’s leadership would bear responsibility for a decision that formally took the party out of government.
There are also significant differences between the two parties over the Cyprus problem, as well as their approaches to foreign policy.
For AKEL, however, securing EDEK’s support would have political and communications value far exceeding the additional votes EDEK could bring to a presidential candidate.
The equation remains complicated for several other reasons.
The most immediate practical obstacle is the uncertainty surrounding EDEK itself.
The party is due to hold an electoral congress on 12 December, while internal negotiations and political manoeuvring continue. The outcome of the leadership process and the party’s subsequent direction remain unclear.
AKEL therefore cannot make any formal move at this stage.
Instead, it has moved its own presidential election preparations into a phase of discussions with grassroots party organisations, effectively buying time until the situation at EDEK becomes clearer.
Andreas Mavroyiannis and the changing political landscape
Andreas Mavroyiannis has never disappeared from AKEL’s list of possible presidential candidates.
He does not, however, appear to be the party’s first choice, although no formal discussion of potential candidates has yet taken place.
His possible candidacy comes with both advantages and disadvantages, including several political and electoral concerns.
According to available information, Mavroyiannis currently appears to have considerable support in terms of potential first-round votes.
That gives him one of the essential qualities of a viable candidate: a realistic prospect of progressing beyond the first round.
He is already well known to the public, removing the need to spend time establishing his profile.
There is also the precedent of his previous cooperation with AKEL, which was broadly successful.
Indeed, whether AKEL eventually chooses Mavroyiannis or another candidate, it is expected to follow the same electoral model as in 2023.
Several factors, however, complicate a possible return to Mavroyiannis.
1. The circumstances of the 2023 election may not be repeated.
In the second round of the 2023 presidential election, some DISY voters were angry with Christodoulides, while party officials also worked behind the scenes to support Mavroyiannis as a way of punishing Christodoulides.
The political circumstances will be different in 2028.
Mavroyiannis might comfortably reach the second round, but victory would be far from guaranteed. Some within the party also see a risk that he could perform worse than in the previous election.
2. His candidacy is unlikely to attract wider party alliances.
AKEL failed to secure cooperation with any other party in 2023, and the prospects remain difficult today.
ALMA has already ruled out supporting Mavroyiannis, while his candidacy would also leave little room for an agreement with Volt.
3. His early announcement of presidential ambitions caused irritation within AKEL.
Mavroyiannis indicated his intention to stand before AKEL had even begun its internal procedures.
The move was not well received at the party’s headquarters, and some interpreted it as an attempt to commit AKEL to supporting him.
4. His positions on the Cyprus problem remain controversial within the party.
There are still strong objections, potentially even stronger than in 2023, to his views on the Cyprus problem and his account of the Crans-Montana negotiations, which differs from AKEL’s position.
Some believe his stance effectively absolves former president Nicos Anastasiades of responsibility for his handling of the Cyprus problem.
5. His selection could be interpreted as a sign that AKEL has run out of alternatives.
Several party figures argue that choosing Mavroyiannis again would suggest political deadlock and an inability to identify another viable candidate.
Despite these reservations, Mavroyiannis remains a strong option for AKEL.
He may not be the first choice, but he is almost certain to feature on the shortlist of candidates considered in the final stages.
If no other viable option emerges, he could become the party’s best alternative.
AKEL general secretary Stefanos Stefanou enjoys considerable popularity as a political figure and has a positive public image beyond his own party.
He also commands strong support among AKEL voters, meaning a presidential candidacy would almost certainly achieve a high level of party unity and mobilisation.
His candidacy would offer voters a clear political platform reflecting AKEL’s positions.
But could he win? And could he attract the alliances needed for victory?
Stefanou is respected across the political spectrum, including by his opponents.
Nevertheless, as AKEL’s general secretary, he would inevitably represent the party’s political programme in its entirety.
That limits both his wider appeal and his ability to attract voters from other political backgrounds, particularly in a political landscape that continues to shift towards the right.
This would be an obstacle not only to AKEL’s chances of winning the election but also to building electoral alliances around his candidacy.
The same considerations apply to any other senior AKEL figure.
For that reason, neither the party leadership nor its wider ranks appear particularly enthusiastic about fielding an internal candidate.
Some regard such a decision as effectively accepting defeat or reinforcing the perception that AKEL does not really want to govern.
Nevertheless, the possibility of an AKEL party candidate cannot be entirely ruled out.
Odysseas Michaelides, Irini Charalambidou and ALMA
AKEL has repeatedly failed to reach formal agreements with other parties in previous presidential elections.
The current political landscape, however, appears more favourable to cooperation.
The 2024 local government elections saw AKEL establish several local partnerships, including in major municipalities, although those elections had their own particular political dynamics.
During the discussions over the presidency of the House of Representatives, AKEL also secured ALMA’s cooperation and support for Stefanos Stefanou’s candidacy.
This was a significant political development for AKEL after years without comparable cooperation.
Another notable element of those negotiations was the discussion with DIKO and an approach by Nicolas Papadopoulos to explore whether AKEL would support his candidacy.
Among the parliamentary parties, ALMA now appears to offer the most realistic prospect of cooperation.
Stefanou and ALMA leader Odysseas Michaelides have already met, with their talks taking place in a very positive atmosphere.
The meeting was also mentioned during AKEL’s Central Committee session.
Turning that goodwill into an electoral agreement, however, will not be easy.
Michaelides has already ruled out voting for several potential candidates, although that does not necessarily prevent cooperation around a third person.
The question is who that person might be.
Would Michaelides accept one of AKEL’s proposed candidates, or would he put forward his own list?
And could that list include Irini Charalambidou?
Charalambidou’s recent actions, social media posts and public comments suggest that she does not favour an alliance between ALMA and AKEL.
Her comments about Averof Neofytou’s ability to govern prompted considerable discussion and led Michaelides to offer clarifications during an interview with a local television station.
Some believe that, despite the diplomatic way he addressed the issue of Neofytou, his remarks indirectly revealed his intentions.
That does not necessarily mean ALMA would cooperate with Neofytou.
However, if talks between ALMA and AKEL collapse, the likely outcome would be a presidential candidacy by either Michaelides or Charalambidou.
Such a development would put pressure on AKEL and could benefit Neofytou if he secures DISY’s presidential nomination.
This is why several AKEL figures have questioned what they regard as contradictions in Charalambidou’s position, particularly when comparing her stance towards former presidential prospect Giorgos Pamboridis with her comments about Neofytou.
“How is it possible that, in one case, she could not vote for a DISY candidate for ideological reasons, yet considers Averof, who was DISY president for 10 years and was associated with the interests of banks and neoliberalism, capable of governing?” AKEL sources questioned.
Cooperation with Direct Democracy would be even more difficult because of the unconventional political thinking of its leadership and the fact that Fidias Panayiotou is favourably disposed towards Neofytou.
Alternatively, Direct Democracy could turn to John Christodoulou.
Volt is another potential partner with which AKEL could establish the basis for cooperation.
However, the party’s new leadership appears to lean more towards Neofytou than AKEL.
The Greens appear to be a more likely partner, although the party’s future direction remains uncertain following the parliamentary election result.
For now, the Greens are in the process of choosing a new leadership.
