Memes, sarcastic videos and posts can carry hardline misogyny while keeping the perfect get-out clause: it’s only a joke.
Misogyny doesn’t always wear the face of extremism, and it doesn’t always come as an open call to violence. Often it hides behind an “innocent” joke, a meme, an ironic post or a piece of self-improvement advice. Dr Matina Peppa, who teaches in the Department of Communication, Media and Culture at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences and is an associate of the Open University of Cyprus, set out to map the Greek manosphere, and her findings are revealing.

Her study reveals a digital ecosystem that doesn’t necessarily call itself the manosphere. It emerges instead through talk of a crisis of masculinity, of “gynocracy” and of the supposed threat feminism poses to men. The common thread is often nostalgia for an idealised past in which gender roles are presented as clear, natural and non-negotiable, along with the belief that modern feminism threatens traditional male identity.
What seems to set the Greek case apart most is the close link between masculinity and national identity and, in some cases, Orthodox identity. Manhood, in other words, isn’t presented only as a personal or gender identity. It is tied to wider ideas about the nation, tradition and traditional values. Defending tradition, she argues, isn’t only about the nation or religion. It often also means defending particular ideas of what it means to be a proper man and a proper woman. Feminism is therefore cast not only as a threat to the proper man, but also to Greekness, to religion and to a whole way of organising society.
Weaponised humour also seems to work well in the Greek manosphere. Humour becomes a vehicle for spreading sexist and misogynistic views, letting their creators dodge responsibility with the excuse that it was just a joke. Through constant repetition, though, memes and irony wear down resistance, make audiences comfortable with stereotypes and gradually make the extreme look normal. “Humour isn’t just entertainment. It can also be a way for more problematic views to become gradually familiar and more socially acceptable. And as I often like to say: humour isn’t a joke. It normalises,” Peppa says.
You have carried out a study on the Greek manosphere (Peppa, M. 2026. Digital narratives of the Greek ‘Manosphere’. Social Cohesion and Development, 20(1), 23–42.). First, what exactly does the term “manosphere” describe, and which groups or online communities does it include?
The “manosphere” is a broad term for a set of online communities and digital subcultures focused on male identity, masculinity and relations between the sexes. It isn’t a single, organised group but a network of different, often overlapping communities. They range from discussions of real social issues affecting men to fiercely anti-feminist and misogynistic views. The ecosystem includes, among others, incels (involuntary celibates), the men’s rights movement (MRA) and MGTOW (Men Going Their Own Way). Incels are the most extreme and troubling strand, because in some of their communities frustration with romantic and sexual life turns into hostility towards women. MRAs focus on issues such as paternal custody or male victimhood, while MGTOW advocates men withdrawing from marriage and heterosexual relationships.
How widespread are these communities?
What matters today is that the manosphere is no longer confined to fringe online forums. Through social media, influencers and the algorithmic spread of content, ideas and terms developed in these communities can reach far wider audiences. Figures such as Andrew Tate are a prime example of this shift, while Netflix’s Adolescence did a great deal to bring the term “manosphere” to the general public. So the manosphere today is not just an online phenomenon. It is also an important field for studying contemporary digital culture, gender identities and the spread of anti-feminist discourse.

Tell us about your research, which sets out to map the Greek manosphere. What features do you identify, and what are the similarities and differences with similar communities abroad?
To map the Greek manosphere, a theoretical approach wasn’t enough. I needed to observe how it takes shape and expresses itself in the digital environment itself. Over three months, from February to May 2025, I carried out a small-scale digital ethnography on X, Facebook, Reddit, YouTube and Instagram, following the relevant discussions and content strategies.
One of the first findings was that the Greek manosphere doesn’t appear as a clearly defined, organised community. The most obvious searches, using terms such as “manosphere” or “incels”, turned up very little. The relevant content surfaced more through indirect terms and narratives, such as the “crisis of masculinity”, “gynocracy” or anti-feminist discourse. That suggests a more scattered and less visible digital community than its English-speaking counterparts.
Despite these differences, the core narratives are strikingly similar to the manosphere in other countries. There is the same nostalgia for an idealised past in which gender roles are presented as clear and “natural”, and the same belief that modern feminism threatens traditional male identity.
What seems to set the Greek case apart most is the close link between masculinity and national identity and, in some cases, Orthodox identity. Manhood isn’t presented only as a personal or gender identity. It is tied to wider ideas about the nation, tradition and traditional values. So the early findings show that the Greek manosphere isn’t simply a smaller version of its international counterparts. It shares a common international ideological repertoire, but adapts it to the Greek social and cultural context.
Is there any data on the demographics of the men who take part in these communities, such as their age, financial situation or education?
I want to be absolutely clear here, because it’s easy to misread the kind of research I did. My method is digital ethnography: I systematically observe and analyse public digital content, looking for recurring patterns, narratives and modes of expression. That means, though, that I have no access to the personal demographics of the users behind each account. So I can’t give reliable data on the age, income or education of people in the Greek manosphere. It would be scientifically problematic to attribute specific demographics to a sample that wasn’t designed to record them.
What we do know from the international literature is that much manosphere content is aimed at young men and teenage boys, who make up a significant audience for so-called manfluencers (Haslop et al., 2024; Rich & Bujalka, 2023). But to answer accurately who the people in the Greek manosphere are, we would need a differently designed, quantitative study that could systematically record their demographic and social characteristics.
According to the Greek manosphere, how should men look and behave, and how should women?
In the material I studied, I didn’t find explicit, direct calls to violence. That doesn’t mean extreme discourse is absent. On the contrary, I found content with strongly misogynistic, homophobic and anti-feminist features, often expressed indirectly through irony, humour, memes or nationalist references. One telling example is an Instagram post describing the supposed “evolution of the Western world” from “androcracy” to “gynocracy” and then to “faggotocracy”. That example shows something else too: anti-feminist discourse is often bound up with other forms of gender and sexual denigration, creating a wider framework of exclusion.
It’s important, though, to distinguish the Greek case from the most extreme examples recorded internationally. The case of Elliot Rodger in California in 2014, who killed six people after posting intensely misogynistic content online, is a stark example of the extreme form incel ideology can take. It isn’t a finding of my own research, and it doesn’t mean online rhetoric automatically leads to violent behaviour. But it does show why it matters to study how misogynistic discourse and gender hostility take shape and spread in digital spaces.
I’d like to dwell on another interesting aspect of your research. How are models of masculinity linked to national identity, and especially to Orthodoxy?
This is perhaps one of the most interesting features my study brought to light. In the Greek manosphere, feminism isn’t presented only as a threat to traditional masculinity, but often as a threat to Greek tradition and identity itself. And in this context, national identity is closely linked to Orthodoxy, tradition and traditional gender roles.
In the small, non-generalisable sample I studied, I found strongly nationalist discourse: references to the “Greekness” of Macedonia, negative and in some cases racist references to Muslim countries and to migration, and a systematic invocation of the Orthodox Church as the foundation of Greek identity. Some profiles also spoke positively of far-right parties or organisations.
What is particularly interesting is the way these elements connect. Defending “tradition” isn’t only about the nation or religion. It often also means defending particular ideas of what it means to be a “proper man” and a “proper woman”. Masculinity, national identity and traditional values thus appear as interlocking parts of a shared narrative, in which preserving gender roles is presented as part of preserving “Greekness” itself.
Algorithms as amplifiers
What role do social media algorithms play in spreading content that promotes misogynistic or extreme views?
Social media algorithms aren’t just neutral conduits for content. They strongly shape what we see, how often we see it and what we are led to next. International research has shown that recommendation systems on platforms such as YouTube and TikTok can nudge users from relatively “innocent” content, such as fitness or self-improvement, towards content promoting more strongly anti-feminist or misogynistic views (Baker, Ging & Brandt Andreasen, 2024).
In my own research I didn’t test how algorithms work experimentally, so it wouldn’t be right to attribute a specific causal effect to them. What I did observe is that Greek manosphere content is already quite scattered and often has limited visibility and engagement, which makes it harder to find. Even so, the international literature shows that algorithmic personalisation and the logic of constant engagement can increase users’ exposure to polarising content.
So I wouldn’t say “algorithms create misogyny”. Rather, they can act as a mechanism that amplifies and reproduces existing views, especially when content provokes a strong emotional reaction and therefore high engagement. That is one of the most important issues for understanding the modern manosphere: how a fringe digital narrative can gain visibility and become part of the wider public conversation.

Humour isn’t a joke. It normalises
Why does weaponised humour seem to work so well in the manosphere? What exactly is the role of humour, memes and irony in making people comfortable with sexist views?
I think this is one of the study’s most interesting findings. In the Greek manosphere, sexist discourse isn’t always expressed directly or aggressively. Very often it comes through humour, memes and irony. Humour creates a kind of “shield”: it presents a sexist statement as a joke and so makes it less likely to be treated as serious or offensive (Berlyne, 1972).
In the material I studied, especially on Facebook and X, I found recurring gender stereotypes. What’s interesting is that these stereotypes are often presented in a way that lets the user treat them as just a joke. If anyone objects, there’s always the easy comeback: “You’ve got no sense of humour.” That is exactly the mechanism that makes humour so important.
It doesn’t mean every sexist joke automatically leads to misogyny. But the international literature shows that repeated exposure to this kind of content can help make stereotypes and prejudice familiar and normal (Cendra, Triutami & Bram, 2019; Schmid, 2023). Humour isn’t just entertainment. It can also be a way for more problematic views to become gradually familiar and more socially acceptable. And as I often like to say: humour isn’t a joke. It normalises.
Can systematic exposure to the manosphere affect how men behave towards women? How, and what might the consequences be?
It wouldn’t be scientifically accurate to say that exposure to the manosphere automatically leads to particular behaviour towards women. My own research is about analysing discourse and content, not experimentally or longitudinally measuring users’ behaviour.
We can, though, draw important indications from international research. Studies have shown a correlation between exposure to manfluencers and the intensity of misogynistic or sexist attitudes, reinforcing an us-versus-them mindset (Renström & Bäck, 2024). That ties in with what I observed in my own research: when sexist discourse is combined with humour, irony and repeated stereotypes, it can help make people comfortable with views that would otherwise be easier to recognise as problematic.
So the possible consequences shouldn’t be sought only in extreme behaviour. They may also involve something more everyday: the normalisation of sexism, the reinforcement of the idea that women and men belong to opposing camps and, ultimately, greater social polarisation around gender issues. That doesn’t mean anyone exposed to this content will become a misogynist or turn violent. It does mean that systematic exposure to certain narratives can gradually shape the framework through which we see relations between the sexes.




