As Cyprus prepares to go to the polls on Sunday, May 24, the country’s party system looks markedly different from any previous election. New parties are challenging the old four-pillar order, social media have replaced youth wings as a route into politics, and anti-establishment sentiment is reshaping the ideological map.
To make sense of it all, en.philenews spoke with Dr Giorgos Charalambous, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nicosia’s Department of Politics and Governance, and one of Cyprus’s leading experts in comparative politics, party systems, and political behaviour.
There seems to be some confusion around the parties’ ideologies. For example, some speak of a ‘left-wing coalition’ between ALMA, Direct Democracy, AKEL, and Volt. Where would you place the parties (AKEL, DISY, DIKO, ELAM, EDEK, Volt, DIPA, Direct Democracy, ALMA, Ecologists, Hunters) in the political/ideological spectrum?
The confusion exists because today in the Cypriot party system, the classic European left–right divide overlaps with new social and political divisions, such as establishment vs anti-establishment, globalist vs nationalist, technocratic vs populist, institutional vs anti-political, and generational divides. Grouping ALMA, Direct Democracy, AKEL, and Volt as a “left coalition” is analytically weak. These parties overlap on some anti-establishment or reformist themes, but ideologically they are quite different.
Let us take each party separately as concerns their locations in the ideological spectrum:
AKEL remains the clearest traditionally ideological party in Cyprus. It is left-wing, communist-rooted, and social democratic in policy outlook, pro-welfare state, labor-oriented, and anti-austerity. DISY is on the Right, as it is economically liberal, pro-business, and often plays the nationalist and conservative card. This is so especially in the light of competition from actors to its right, such as ELAM, but also diachronically because it has traditionally been supported by a large popular base of right-wing conservatives and nationalists.
DIKO is difficult to place on a classic left-right axis. Historically, it is nationalist-centrist, statist, and pragmatic in the sense of coalition flexibility. It combines moderate welfare support, conservatism, and a strong focus on the Cyprus problem. On both these issues and in what concerns its positions, and role in parliament on the economy and vis-à-vis the banking sector, it is closer to a right-wing actor. EDEK is historically socialist/social democratic, but it also developed strong nationalist tendencies, tougher Cyprus-problem positions, and culturally conservative instincts. This creates a hybrid identity, combining an economically center-left profile with a culturally and nationally conservative orientation.
ELAM is clearly a far-right, ultra-nationalist, anti-immigration, and socially conservative party. It has moderated some of its positions, rebranded as something different from its original sister party in Greece, Golden Dawn, and been mainstreamed by the media, but it does sustain a background ideology that is extremist and strongly anti-communist. Such ideas have come out into the open during this electoral campaign. Volt is socially progressive, strongly pro-European, liberal, and technocratic. Economically, it sits around center-left liberalism and social-liberal politics.
ALMA is still ideologically fluid. Its core identity is not left or right, but anti-corruption, institutional reform, accountability, and anti-clientelism. Economically, it appears relatively centrist, yet recent statements by Odysseas Michaelides may suggest an overall center-right course forward.
Direct Democracy is primarily anti-political, populist, digitally native, personality-centered, and anti-establishment. Its stance mixes libertarian impulses, participatory democracy rhetoric, anti-elite sentiment, and post-ideological messaging.
DIPA is essentially a center-right and pragmatic party, less ideological, more managerial. The Ecologists are environmentally focused, progressive on many social issues, and usually center-left in European terms, but with a strong nationalist sentiment. The Hunters Movement is mostly a party that combines sectoral populism and rural conservatism, mobilising anti-urban sentiment and hunting-rights politics; it is clearly a right-wing formation.
Overall, the center and right wing of the political spectrum are highly fragmented, while only AKEL can be clearly identified as left-wing when considering both main issue dimensions of political competition – the socio-economic and the socio-cultural.
How have TikTok and short-form reels shaped this election?
TikTok and short-form reels have become normalised across the party system; they are now a fully acceptable, indeed seen as necessary, type of political mobilisation and campaigning. This also shapes citizen perceptions about politics and political spaces or personas. Simple, direct, often vague, and quick messages may have implications for how voters behave and choose. Ultimately, they have substituted more coherent policy formulation, as in long manifestos, and increased the focus of parties on electoral and in-between elections mobilisation on social media.
TikTok changes things structurally: it rewards personality over institutions, it compresses political communication, it bypasses gatekeepers, and it intensifies anti-establishment politics. More generally, algorithmic systems tend to reward emotional intensity, conflict driven by the energy of the outsider, and anti-elite messaging. What makes this election cycle especially important is not simply that politicians use social media — that has existed for years — but that political legitimacy itself is increasingly being mediated through algorithmic attention rather than party structures.
It is indeed a historical shift in the pathway into politics; today, instead of youth wings, unions, municipalities, and party hierarchies as the way of political recruitment, someone can potentially enter national politics through YouTube, TikTok, podcasts, livestreams, and audience-building.
How do you explain the rise of new parties such as ALMA and Direct Democracy? Did they rise for the same reasons?
Their electorates differ, so they rose for different reasons, yet at a time of very low democratic legitimacy and open political space to occupy. ALMA’s rise is closely tied to the personal credibility of Odysseas Michaelides, the former Auditor General. His public image was built around exposing corruption, misuse of public money, and elite impunity — especially during and after the “golden passports” scandals. The supporters of ALMA often include former DISY, DIKO, AKEL, and abstaining voters.
The rise of Direct Democracy is less about institutional reform and more about the rejection of conventional politics itself. It reflects the distrust toward professional politicians, online participatory culture, personalization through social media, and the appeal of authenticity over expertise. Fidias first built influence outside politics entirely, through YouTube and social media. His political capital comes from appearing “unfiltered,” anti-elite, and culturally distant from the traditional political class. This resembles broader European and global trends where influencers and online personalities convert audience trust into political capital.
What would Direct Democracy’s entry into parliament indicate about public attitudes towards parties, institutions, and representative democracy?
It would indicate a shift within the conventional political culture in Cyprus, and signal above all a crisis of party legitimacy, suggesting that conventional party politics no longer monopolise political representation. Therefore, a successful Direct Democracy would be proof that many citizens now see parties less as representatives, communities, or ideological homes, and more as closed elites and career networks involved in patronage practices, or rigid bureaucracies disconnected from society.
That would reflect a broader European trend of declining party membership, weakening ideological attachment, and erosion of trust in intermediary institutions, as well as a desire by citizens for a more direct relationship with politics. In many ways, such phenomena in Cyprus lag most other European countries, where similar formations and political styles have been observed during the past decade.
Is there enough electoral space for ALMA, Direct Democracy, and Volt to all enter parliament, or are they competing for overlapping pools of dissatisfied voters?
To some degree, they are competing for voters, but not to the extent that all three can’t enter parliament. At first glance, they all appear to compete for dissatisfied citizens, anti-establishment sentiment, younger or politically detached voters, and people frustrated with the traditional parties. But beneath that surface, they mobilize quite different political emotions and social identities. That distinction may allow them to coexist electorally.
Dissatisfied voters are not one bloc; some are anti-corruption reformists, others are anti-political, others are progressive-modernisers, others are nationalist protest voters, and many are simply detached from party politics altogether, or are unregistered. ALMA, Direct Democracy, and Volt speak to different parts of this landscape.
Could ALMA and Volt attract voters who previously abstained, or is this only Direct Democracy’s advantage?
They could, but with lower likelihood than Direct Democracy, because the latter party is more apolitical and more attractive to the protest vote. Direct Democracy’s strongest comparative advantage is with anti-political voters, younger disengaged citizens, and people culturally detached from party politics. Fidias Panayiotou speaks the language of people who often never identified with political institutions and the political process in the first place.
ALMA’s abstention appeal is different and potentially broader among older and middle-class voters. Its message resonates with citizens angry about corruption, former mainstream party voters (from AKEL, DISY, DIKO, and EDEK), professionals, and people who withdrew from politics out of disappointment rather than nihilism. So, ALMA can reactivate abstainers who still want competent governance, state reform, and institutional maturity.
Volt’s potential abstention voters are usually not deeply anti-political. Instead, they often feel underrepresented, ideologically disconnected, or frustrated by the lack of modern policy options. Volt may therefore attract previous abstainers from universities and urban centres and younger or middle-aged professionals.
What do you think are the main conditions a new party needs to meet in Cyprus to cross the parliamentary threshold: name recognition, organisational structure, candidate quality, media visibility, protest sentiment, or local networks?
The success of new parties increasingly depends on visibility, emotional resonance with circulating social feelings, personality, anti-establishment energy, and turnout asymmetry. Cyprus is moving closer to the fragmented and personalised political systems seen elsewhere in Europe. That does not mean organization is irrelevant — but it is less relevant, since now it often comes after initial electoral success rather than before it.
Can the traditional parties (AKEL, DISY, DIKO, EDEK) ever regain their past share of votes? If yes, what must they do?
Probably not, as we have now entered a new party system format, where the processes of political representation and participation are much more fragmented, and volatility is likely here to stay, as the structural conditions that facilitate it are now entrenched, from social media and person-centric mobilisation to disillusionment with the political class and more superficial party identities. New divisions – generational, attitudinal, or ideological- lead to the creation of more actors, making it increasingly difficult for the party system to return to a four-pillar format.
How important will abstention be for the chances of smaller parties? Does lower turnout help disciplined new parties or hurt them?
Abstention is probably one of the central variables shaping the future of Cyprus’s smaller parties — including ALMA, Direct Democracy, ELAM, Volt, and others. But its effects are not uniform. Low turnout can either help or hurt smaller parties, depending on what kind of party they are and who stays home. Low turnout generally helps disciplined, emotionally motivated, anti-establishment, or ideologically cohesive smaller parties.
But it can hurt loose protest movements, personality-driven parties, or digitally popular movements whose supporters are politically disengaged. So, abstention is not automatically “good for small parties.” It helps parties whose supporters are more likely to vote than everyone else.
Does Volt represent a new liberal, progressive, and pro-European current in Cyprus, or is its appeal still too concentrated among specific urban and younger voters?
It is liberal, has progressive elements, and it is certainly pro-EU and pro-European integration. Volt attracts globally oriented younger voters, English-speaking professionals, and socially liberal urban segments. Yet, it is only partly new, as its political profile can be compared with EDI (United Democrats), the party founded by former President Giorgos Vasiliou, in terms of its pro-European orientation, reformist liberal identity, urban/educated support base, and positioning outside the main party blocs. But Volt is more movement-based, more ideologically ‘European-progressive’, and operating in a far more fragmented and volatile political environment.
ELAM rose as a nationalist protest party. Although, according to the polls, it seems to be heading for its best electoral showing yet, do you think its association with Christodoulides is turning it into an establishment party and hurting its image as a protest party?
In Cyprus, ELAM’s rise was built on a combination of nationalist grievance, anti-elite anger, anti-immigration politics, distrust toward the traditional parties, and frustration with the post-2013 political order. That outsider identity was central to its growth. Now, ELAM is in a transitional phase. It is no longer marginal but not fully established either. That creates tension because ELAM has become more associated with compromise, parliamentary routines, strategic alliances, and state power.
According to party consolidation figures, about twenty per cent of its 2021 voters have abandoned it, and a new far-right party, Lacedemonians, accusing ELAM of being systemic, is contesting the election. Many voters may increasingly perceive ELAM as indirectly supporting government stability, operating within institutional politics, and influencing state power from inside the system rather than outside it. Indeed, there appears to be a tension between its initial electorate – angry anti-system voters, racist and violent youth, hard nationalists, politically alienated ultra-conservatives, and nativist voters – and its emerging new electorate – conservative voters disappointed with DISY, young people from DISY families, and xenophobic voters, along with a part of the protest vote.
At the same time, institutionalisation and normalisation can make ELAM appear more legitimate and governable, as well as less frightening to moderate conservative voters. That may expand its electorate beyond its current share of the protest vote and protest voters more broadly. Despite the tension between protest and the establishment that ELAM finds itself in, it could still achieve its strongest result yet because the structural conditions helping radical-right parties remain strong: immigrant hostility, distrust toward elites, nationalism, fragmentation of the center-right, economic insecurity, and anger at traditional parties.
At the same time, some voters now support ELAM not because it is anti-system, but because they genuinely agree with its nationalism, identity politics, or conservative positions. That can make its electorate more resilient than purely protest parties and achieve right-wing ideological consolidation and thus the further normalisation of exclusionist and chauvinist ideas in society and politics.
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