In a constantly changing world facing numerous internal challenges, Turkey is seeking to establish its position in the international and regional geopolitical arena through shifting alliances, moving beyond the West and focusing on other regional powers.
Turkey’s pursuit of direct interests in regions such as Syria and the Caucasus is evaluated through the lens of its national security and increasing strategic influence, particularly in relation to Western interests and priorities.
In her interview with Phileleftheros, Nigar Göksel, Türkiye Project Director at the International Crisis Group, who recently visited Cyprus at the invitation of the Politeia think tank with support from the Universitas Foundation, explained how Ankara is trying to expand its role and increase its influence in the broader region. From Libya to Syria and the Caucasus, Turkey is developing a complex web of economic relationships and strategic interests, adjusting its approach according to developments.
Regarding Cyprus, Göksel emphasised that the island is not an immediate priority for Ankara, as geostrategic and economic demands supersede the local conflict. Nevertheless, the Cyprus issue remains an unresolved problem affecting all sides, though there is room for improving relations between all parties.
On the Kurdish issue, Nigar Göksel highlighted the existing challenges and the need for a new approach, as developments in Syria affect the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkey seeks the disarmament of the Kurdish organisation and its participation in political processes, though prospects for this remain uncertain.
I’ll begin the interview by taking the question from the title of the seminar you recently participated in in Cyprus. What does Turkey want today?
Turkey is not a monolithic country. It’s a very diverse nation, both in terms of its society and political landscape. What I can say is that there’s a growing consensus among the security and political establishment about how Turkey should position itself on the international stage. It’s no longer an extension of the West but is moving towards other regional powers as well. You know, when I look at how Turkey positions itself in various regions, I see more of a pattern of variable alliances.
This means case-by-case cooperation. For example, in areas where Russia or Iran have leverage or can play an active, disruptive role, Turkey seeks increased influence, while in others, it doesn’t hesitate to stand against them. In the Gulf region, as elsewhere, there’s a perception of a strategic vacuum emerging as the US shifts its centre of gravity elsewhere.
And so, like other actors, Turkey tries to benefit, using its comparative advantage to maximise gains in influence, resources, power, and strength. The game is now very open with many players. The choice isn’t simply whether to align with the West or not; there are more areas in which to manoeuvre.
Turkey has been involved in various conflicts in recent years. What motivates its presence in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus?
Unfortunately, it’s difficult to give a comprehensive, general answer. In some cases, involvement is tied to immediate security interests, and in others, it’s about enhancing strategic position. For instance, in Syria’s case, there are two priorities. One is to contain and, if possible, eliminate the Syrian Democratic Forces (YPG) and prevent them from establishing a controlled, potentially autonomous statelet in northwestern Syria.
The other is to maintain relative calm in those areas so that Syrians living there don’t flood towards the Turkish borders and multiply the refugee crisis. Currently, the refugee issue is one of the country’s biggest economic, social, and political problems. In the southern Caucasus, on the other hand, Turkey seeks to increase its influence, as it’s a particularly important region serving as a gateway to Central Asia. The idea is that a corridor of transport, railways, ports and roads, communications and transportation will make Turkey a hub between Asia and Europe.
To what extent do you see Turkey’s foreign policy in the region being influenced by nationalist rhetoric at home and domestic political needs?
That’s a good question and it’s something discussed within Turkey itself. Perhaps it’s like the chicken and the egg – which came first? Foreign policy is a popular issue. If you ask opposition parties, they would change little, since they agree with the government on most matters. Perhaps they’d just want a bit more cooperation with the European Union. But otherwise, they largely agree. I think the political discourse on foreign policy can sometimes be more oriented towards domestic society and other times not. So, for example, in the Turkish world in Central Asia, Turkey uses more of a Turkish rhetoric. In Africa, it prefers an anti-colonial rhetoric, just as in the Middle East it approaches the rhetoric of Sunni Muslims. But the common intersection of all its actions is a strategic calculation of what it wants to achieve. This doesn’t always work, as shown by the pragmatic readjustments it has made in such cases.
Does the Hamas conflict with Israel affect Ankara’s regional ambitions? And if so, how?
I believe the biggest impact has to do with the diminishing reputation and legitimacy of the West and the international community in the eyes of the Turkish people due to the protection of civilians, the non-sale of weapons to warring parties, and violations of international law. The normative superiority of Western moral authority has faded very quickly, while it was already heavily eroded. The war in Gaza has accelerated the view that Western morality is a kind of empty concept. This is why Turkey isn’t among the mediators for ending the crisis, unlike Egypt and Qatar.
Why didn’t Turkey want to take on such a role?
Neither the Arab countries nor Israel wanted this. And perhaps Turkey doesn’t have the corresponding influence within Palestinian circles either. They might seek a more dynamic role once a ceasefire is achieved, for example with security guarantees or in the reconstruction of the area.
Many analysts, however, view the war between Israel and Hamas as a conflict between Shiite and Sunni Islam. Where does Turkey stand on this?
Certainly for countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, containing Iranian influence is a priority and has much greater importance than it does for Turkey. Turkey and Iran communicate on many issues from the economy to development projects or what’s happening in other countries in the region like Iraq and Azerbaijan. I mean, there are many issues on the agenda between the two countries that aren’t disrupted by the Shiite-Sunni divide. Looking at it somewhat cynically, the biggest threat to Turkey from the Israel-Iran conflict is Syria.
I believe that an escalation with consequences such as increased refugees, recruitment of Kurdish fighters, or the activation of Iranian proxies in Syria is what frightens Ankara, which believes that whatever happens in its neighbouring country affects Turkey itself. And this is perhaps its priority – to reduce these consequences.
Restrictive lines must be broken
Having experience in this matter, how do you see the Cyprus issue evolving? Is a solution feasible?
In the complex security system Turkey is involved in, Cyprus is simply a small peripheral problem. The situation has been the same for years, there’s no immediate conflict, nobody is being killed, and there’s no urgent need for a solution. On the other hand, simultaneously, more layers of geostrategic and economic interests are being added to the local conflict, making this situation increasingly entrenched.
As concluded in our Crisis Group report, I believe what matters now is minimising the negative consequences caused by the conflict through openings in trade and travel, to increase interaction not only between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots but also between Greek Cypriots and Turkey. As part of a broader package, we suggested that Turkey open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels or European vessels that also come to the Republic of Cyprus ports, so there would be some kind of economic benefit. The restrictive lines must be broken. The same applies to Turkish Cypriots who, with fewer economic restrictions, will manage to reduce their dependence on Turkey, something that over time could turn into economic salvation for them.
Kurdish settlement difficult but not impossible
The recent attack in Ankara reminded us that the Kurdish issue remains significant for Turkish politics. Do you see ways it can be resolved?
Your question is timely because the risk of Syria’s destabilisation brings back to the forefront the need for some kind of settlement in the conflict with the PKK. The risk of Syria becoming destabilised highlights the importance of the PKK conflict. There’s also concern about what will happen in the region after the American elections, while another reason the PKK conflict has returned to the agenda is following Devlet Bahçeli’s statements that an agreement with Abdullah Öcalan could be used to form a new agreement with the PKK, according to which they would lay down their arms.
But is something like that easy to achieve? I mean, granting amnesty to the imprisoned Kurdish leader and the PKK laying down arms?
It’s difficult but not impossible. There will certainly be reactions. However, the PKK leadership currently has reasons to pursue this, as they’ve become more trapped than ever in Iraq due to Ankara and Baghdad’s military moves and agreements.
I’ll return, though, and ask in what way can the issue be resolved?
What Turkey wants is for the PKK to lay down its arms and for its activities to become political, participating in elections for example. But what the Kurds can get is another story. Certainly, the Turkish government won’t discuss either granting autonomy or linguistic or other cultural rights. Perhaps if the PKK leadership leaves Turkey, Kurds within the country will find the opportunity for greater political activity.
Playing multiple sides
Although Turkey is a NATO member, it makes moves in other directions such as towards BRICS. How can these actions be accepted?
Ankara sees NATO as a military alliance and BRICS as an economic one. As long as it’s not an EU member, joining BRICS neither conflicts with the customs union agreement nor falls within NATO requirements. It remains to be seen if BRICS will accept Turkey as a member, however, it’s a move that aligns with Turkish philosophy for a more multidimensional economic situation, with more diversification and less dependence on Western companies. The concern is that economic relations can become leverage, and there have been cases in the past where Turkey felt its economy was an element making its strategic autonomy less viable. So, this is the logic that I think makes them engage in these kinds of things. Either way, in Turkey they don’t see any conflict or contradiction.
Many challenges for women
Turkey has withdrawn from the Istanbul Convention. What was the impact of this move on women’s rights in the country?
Symbolically, it meant a lot for women. It meant a lot regarding the message the state itself sends and the sense of empowerment of women’s NGOs, their actions and the standards they provide. It was a blow. Practically, we haven’t seen major changes. Neither the criminal code nor civil law changed regarding women’s protection and rights. So in reality, at the implementation level, I think it had less influence than the message of withdrawal from the Convention itself.
What is the current situation with women’s rights in Turkey?
I’ll give you my personal opinion because this doesn’t fall within my research interests. For me, a very serious fundamental problem is the very low participation of women in the labour market. This is a result of both the stigma associated with women’s role in society and the fact that there aren’t sufficient state resources to support them financially, so they remain primarily responsible for children, housework, and elderly care. The result is that they stay in their homes without economic independence and cannot escape from environments that aren’t safe for them. This has a direct impact on the economy too – how can a country develop when half its population is out of work? That’s why even if women have rights, when they aren’t financially independent, it’s difficult for them to exercise them.
