How far can a state or politician’s tolerance stretch regarding third-party interventions or directives? From a rhetorical standpoint, the answer is surely that no one should accept interference from third parties. From an ideological-political perspective or within the framework of cooperation, one might tolerate any form of intervention or directive.
Cyprus has historically always tended to accept and tolerate interventions, directives or admonishments from third parties, particularly when there was ideological-political proximity with whoever was making the intervention. In the modern political history of the Republic of Cyprus, in the post-1974 period, we find numerous examples of third-party interventions in matters that Cypriots should have handled alone.
Suddenly, from last Saturday, an intense debate began following an email sent by Israel’s Minister of Diaspora Affairs in early August, requesting that the Cypriot government remove graffiti appearing in various areas of Cyprus. Whether this graffiti contained elements of antisemitism or was pro-Palestinian is an issue no one can objectively determine.
In this case, we have a minister, Amichai Chikli, who sent a letter demanding the removal of slogans from Cypriot walls. I imagine he has taken similar action with other governments.
AKEL reacted strongly to a letter from the Interior Ministry to municipal and community unions requesting the removal of any slogans. AKEL questioned who is calling the shots in our country and whether it is Netanyahu.
DISY responded to AKEL’s position by reminding AKEL that it had “historically chosen to approach international issues with blinkers and ideological obsessions” and strongly supported the Soviet Union.
DISY’s position could be extended with reference to Sergey Astahov (USSR ambassador to Cyprus) who in November 1978 had summoned AKEL’s leadership and asked them to reject the Anglo-American-Canadian plan because it came from three NATO countries. Following that intervention (as Nikos Rolandis wrote in his book), AKEL decided to reject the plan, which subsequently influenced then-President Spyros Kyprianou.
Between Astahov’s intervention and Amichai’s letter, decades have passed, but essentially some things have not changed. In party offices, they know very well how many times they have heard foreign diplomats artfully trying to advance a position or viewpoint to create a particular climate.
Let us not invoke the difficult period before the referendum on the Annan Plan, where interventions, directives and admonishments from third parties were also very common. Afterwards, there were similar interventions from third parties trying to convince Greek Cypriots that they were to blame for the rejection, and eventually convincing them that they bore responsibility for the “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots and for all other matters they endured, absolving Turkey.
Even in 2017, various third parties coming and going from political offices convinced many that it was the Greek Cypriot side that abandoned the negotiation table, creating a significant alibi for the Turkish side which it has since exploited.
Third-party interventions in Cyprus are a common phenomenon; what is needed is the ability to cut them off early. So far, we have not seen anything of the sort happening. We might see it at some point in the future, but until then, everyone has a long way to go.
