As transatlantic tensions expose the risks of technological dependence, Brussels and national governments are trying to build a European alternative, however this alternative will require more than mere political will, according to recent publication of the European Commission.
A geopolitical wake-up call
For years US companies offered the cloud infrastructure, software and computing power that European governments and businesses needed, while European alternatives struggled to compete at the same scale.
That arrangement is becoming increasingly difficult for European policymakers to accept leading to governments across the European Union reassessing their reliance on technology providers headquartered outside the bloc. What was once primarily a debate about competition and data protection is becoming a question of strategic security.
As Washington’s approach to its European allies becomes less predictable, EU policymakers are confronting a fundamental vulnerability: dependence.
The European Commission’s decision to award a €180 million cloud-services contract to European providers Post Telecom, STACKIT, Scaleway and Proximus marks an important step in addressing that dependence. It signals that European institutions are prepared to use their purchasing power to strengthen the continent’s own technology industry.
Sovereignty moves up Brussels’ agenda
In June, Brussels presented a technological sovereignty package encompassing proposals for a Cloud and AI Development Act and a Chips Act 2.0, alongside an EU Open Source Strategy. The initiatives seek to expand European computing capacity, encourage investment in critical technologies and establish a common framework for assessing digital sovereignty.
The proposed Cloud and AI Development Act aims to triple the EU’s data-centre capacity within five to seven years. It also envisages different levels of sovereignty, allowing public authorities to assess how much independence is necessary for different services.
National governments are already providing examples of how that transition might work.
France plans to move government departments away from Microsoft and Zoom, while Schleswig-Holstein in Germany has been replacing Microsoft products with open-source alternatives. Other governments and public institutions are reviewing their dependence on foreign platforms.
Taken together, these initiatives suggest that digital sovereignty is no longer a fringe ambition championed by a handful of European policymakers. It is becoming part of the EU’s wider effort to strengthen its economic and strategic autonomy.
The risks of relying on Washington
The security argument is central to Europe’s reassessment.
EU governments need assurances that critical systems will remain available during diplomatic disputes, commercial conflicts or major technical disruptions.
Cloud services support an expanding range of public functions, from administrative databases and communications to healthcare, education and local government operations. Dependence can leave institutions exposed to outages, contractual changes and difficulties switching suppliers.
The problem is not that every US tech company should be considered an adversary, but that EU governments cannot fully control the commercial decisions, legal obligations or geopolitical environment surrounding companies over which they have limited jurisdiction, meaning that essential public services should not depend on assumptions about the permanence of political goodwill.
Europe’s cloud ambitions meet a technological reality
Yet the push for sovereignty faces a fundamental contradiction in that Europe can build more data centres and transfer government workloads to European providers without necessarily controlling all the technology those systems require.
The cloud industry depends on an extensive international supply chain encompassing semiconductors, networking equipment, software, storage and specialised technical expertise, much of that ecosystem remains dominated by companies based outside Europe.
Earlier this week French cloud provider Scaleway announced plans for a new AI computing site in Copenhagen using Nvidia’s latest-generation systems, alongside an AMD-powered AI supercomputer in Sweden. The projects would expand the computing capacity available to European customers and provide additional options for organisations seeking to host AI workloads within Europe.
However, the use of US-designed and supplied processors also demonstrates why European ownership of infrastructure does not automatically amount to complete technological independence.
A European company can control the data centre, operate under European law and offer customers greater control over their information while still depending on foreign suppliers for critical components. Therefore, achieving complete independence across every layer of the technology stack would be extraordinarily difficult and potentially prohibitively expensive.
A question of money, not just security
The economic argument is equally important as European governments and businesses spend substantial sums on US software and cloud services. Redirecting even part of that spending towards European companies could help invest in research and development, attract skilled workers and compete more effectively in the global market.
Public procurement is particularly important because governments can provide the stable demand that emerging technology companies need to scale. The Commission’s cloud contract may be relatively modest compared with the size of the global cloud market, but it sends a message that European providers can become serious suppliers to major public institutions.
Without a sufficiently large customer base, European companies may struggle to match the investment capacity of US hyper-scalers. Without competitive European alternatives, governments will remain dependent on foreign providers, regardless of their political preferences, nonetheless, sovereignty comes at a price.
Replacing established platforms can involve retraining, compatibility problems and the rebuilding of applications that have become deeply embedded in public administration.
Furthermore, European providers must also demonstrate that they can deliver the performance, reliability and support required by governments and large businesses.
European taxpayers should not be expected to finance inefficient systems simply because they are European, but price alone is also an inadequate measure of value. Procurement decisions that ignore geopolitical exposure, supplier concentration and the cost of losing access to critical infrastructure risk understating the long-term costs of dependence.
Strategic autonomy without technological isolation
Europe’s push for digital sovereignty should not be confused with a project to sever every technological connection with the United States.
Transatlantic research, investment and commercial cooperation remain important to both economies. European companies will continue to use international supply chains, and attempting to reproduce every component domestically could divert resources from areas where Europe has a stronger chance of competing.
The main concern here is whether European governments have meaningful alternatives when security requirements, commercial interests or political circumstances are demanding them.
That distinction also provides a useful test for the EU’s emerging policies.
A credible sovereignty strategy should expand competition, strengthen domestic expertise and improve the ability to switch suppliers. It should not merely attach a European label to infrastructure that remains dependent on a narrow set of foreign-controlled technologies.
The Commission’s proposed sovereignty framework is a step towards making those distinctions more explicit. Its success, however, will depend on how the rules are implemented, how much investment follows and whether European providers can deliver services that customers genuinely want to use.
Europe’s credibility is now at stake
The drive for digital sovereignty reflects a broader shift in how Europe understands its place in the global economy.
For too long, the continent’s role in several critical technology markets has been shaped by dependence on foreign companies whose scale and investment capacity European competitors have struggled to match.
Geopolitical tensions have made the risks of that model harder to ignore.
Brussels now has an opportunity to turn a defensive response into a more ambitious industrial project: building competitive European cloud providers, supporting open-source development, expanding computing infrastructure and ensuring that public institutions retain meaningful control over their digital systems.
That will will require sustained investment, strict coordination between member states and a willingness to measure progress against practical outcomes rather than political rhetoric.
The ultimate test is whether the EU can ensure that no external supplier, however powerful, becomes indispensable to the functioning of its public institutions.
Digital sovereignty is therefore not simply about where Europe’s data is stored but who holds the power to access, operate, change or withdraw the technology on which European society increasingly relies, and building that capacity is seemingly an essential part of Europe’s goal of becoming a stable and independent global player.
(Sources: European Commission, Financial Times, French Government, Reuters)
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