In an age when information is more abundant than ever, the question is no longer simply whether citizens are adequately informed, but how information reaches them — and, crucially, who has the final say in what they see. The digital transition has multiplied sources and fundamentally transformed the media landscape, creating new opportunities but also new challenges for democracy and public debate.
Social media has become the primary gateway to news, influencing not only younger generations but an ever-growing share of the population, says Antonis Kalogeropoulos, Associate Professor of Communication at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. News consumption, he explains, is becoming faster, more fragmented and often more passive, while algorithms increasingly shape what we see, limiting the user’s ability to choose directly.
At the same time, there is a close relationship between being informed and voter turnout. Citizens who are better informed are more likely to vote, engage in political activity and make more considered decisions, knowing where the parties stand. The flipside, he notes, is that a lack of information is often associated with political disengagement and lower participation — which in turn deepens inequalities in democratic representation.
Within this environment, disinformation has emerged as one of the greatest challenges. Although it does not affect everyone in the same way, it can fuel suspicion, erode trust and, in some cases, even interfere with democratic processes. “The audience already more prone to conspiratorial thinking, or with lower trust in institutions, is more likely to adopt such narratives. In that sense, disinformation reinforces pre-existing attitudes rather than creating them from scratch,” he argues.
Are people today less informed, or are there simply more and different sources of information than in the past?
Both are true at the same time. On one hand, there is a huge supply of information, with more and more varied sources than ever before. On the other, we see a minority in many countries that follows no news at all — mainly people with low political interest. That minority has always existed, but it is growing, partly because of technological changes. One shift, for example, is the move to streaming services for entertainment — Spotify, Netflix and the like. These platforms carry virtually no news, whereas broadcast television and radio have always given it a central role. For many years, that incidental exposure was important for keeping low-interest audiences informed. There are other factors too, of course: audience dissatisfaction with news coverage, the nature of the news agenda itself, and a lack of trust in the media.
Have social networks replaced traditional media as the main source of news? And if so, is this only a younger-generation phenomenon, or does it affect everyone?
This used to be mainly true of younger age groups, but we are now seeing more and more older people getting their news primarily through social media. The shift towards social networks is no longer a purely “generational” phenomenon — it is becoming something that affects the population as a whole, even if the intensity and patterns of use differ. This includes platforms used mainly for video consumption, such as TikTok, YouTube and, to a degree, Instagram. Their importance has grown significantly in recent years, as they attract an ever-larger share of user attention and have become key entry points to news — often without users consciously seeking it out.
At the same time, the platforms themselves have changed character. They operate less and less as traditional social networks — spaces where content from friends and acquaintances dominates — and more and more as content consumption channels. What we see is chosen largely by algorithm, based on what the platform judges will hold our attention, rather than on who we have chosen to follow. This model, established largely by TikTok, has shaped the entire digital ecosystem. News consumption has become more fragmented, more personalised and often more passive, as users are exposed to stories through a continuous content feed without necessarily making any active choice about their sources. So the transition is not only about which media we use, but about how exactly we consume news.
In which countries is social media use for news particularly high?
Social media use for news is highest in countries where traditional media lack strong brands and high levels of public trust. In those environments, citizens turn more readily to alternative sources, and social networks function as the main gateway to news. This is evident in a number of countries in the Global South, but also in many Mediterranean countries, where trust in the media is often lower and the media landscape more fragmented. In recent years we have seen the same trend strengthening in the United States, where polarisation and distrust of traditional media have driven increasing reliance on social networks for news.
By contrast, in Northern European countries — Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom — the proportion of people using social media as their primary news source is lower. This is linked to the presence of strong, established and relatively trusted news organisations that continue to command high levels of public confidence and remain the main points of reference for citizens. Overall, it appears that social media use for news depends not only on how widely the platforms are used, but to a large extent on institutional and cultural factors: trust in the media, the quality of journalism and the degree of political polarisation.
What is the relationship between being informed and electoral participation?
This relationship is well established in the political science literature. Citizens who are better informed are more likely to vote, to take part in political activities of various kinds, and to make more considered decisions, knowing where the parties stand. Being informed is also linked to higher levels of political efficacy — the sense that participation is meaningful and can actually influence political outcomes. Conversely, a lack of information is often associated with political disengagement and lower levels of participation, which reinforces inequalities in democratic representation.
Let’s return to algorithms. How much choice do we actually have over what news we see?
As I mentioned, social media — following the model established by TikTok — exposes us less and less to content from the accounts we choose to follow, and more and more to content the platform decides is “for us.” The videos we see are largely the result of algorithmic choices rather than our own selections. This means our exposure to news becomes more personalised but also more opaque — it is not always clear why we are shown one thing and not another. Algorithms work in theory on behavioural data: what we watch, what we like, how long we spend on a piece of content. In this way they gradually shape the stream of news we receive. The reality is more complex, and is not fully transparent to anyone outside the platforms themselves.
What are the main mechanisms that allow false news to spread so quickly?
It spreads quickly because it tends to attract a great deal of attention on social media — reactions, shares, comments. This is content that is either designed, or simply ends up being, more “attention-grabbing”: more emotional, more extreme, more confrontational. We know that algorithms reward this kind of content with greater visibility to more users, because they are built around engagement metrics. This creates an amplification loop: content that already attracts attention gets pushed even further, regardless of its accuracy.
Unfortunately, the platforms have not done enough to curb this, particularly when it comes to preventing the initial spread. That said, exposure to disinformation does not automatically lead to belief in it — accepting it is a more complex process that depends on users’ pre-existing attitudes and perceptions.
How news consumption is linked to disinformation
How does the way we consume news online relate to the spread of disinformation?
The way we consume news is strongly linked to exposure to disinformation, but much less so to actually believing it. Using traditional media is generally associated with a lower likelihood of encountering disinformation, since those outlets operate according to more consistent journalistic standards and editorial filters. Social media use, by contrast, is associated with greater exposure to disinformation — mainly because content circulates faster, without the same editorial processes, and is amplified through shares and algorithmic recommendations. However, greater exposure does not necessarily translate into greater belief. Accepting disinformation is a more complex process that depends on pre-existing attitudes and perceptions.
Particularly important is the way social networks are used for news. When people use them in the belief that they contain the “hidden truth” that traditional media are suppressing — a view that is fairly widespread in Greece, for example — then social media use is more likely to be associated with greater belief in disinformation. In that case, it fits into a broader framework of distrust in institutions.
Do you see increased demand for that kind of content?
Overall, we can say that almost all of us are exposed to significant amounts of disinformation in the digital environment, but relatively few people actually believe it. That said, there is a minority of the audience that appears to actively seek out this type of content — either because it relates to issues they feel strongly about, such as the pandemic or climate change, or because it serves a need for political confrontation. This combination of supply and demand is key to understanding why disinformation remains so visible in the digital environment.
Can disinformation affect trust in electoral processes — and ultimately the outcome of elections themselves?
It certainly can, although we have not seen any systematic challenge to election results in Greece or Cyprus in recent decades. We have, however, seen exactly this in countries such as the United States after the 2020 elections and Brazil in 2022. In those cases, disinformation contributed to spreading doubt about the legitimacy of the electoral process. But the issue is not solely a social media one — political elites play a decisive role too, and in some cases have actively cultivated a climate of contestation, reinforcing or lending legitimacy to such narratives. Social media functions more as a mechanism for amplifying and disseminating these messages than as their original source.
The impact of disinformation is also not uniform across the population. Those already more prone to conspiratorial thinking, or with lower trust in institutions, are more likely to embrace such narratives. In that sense, disinformation reinforces pre-existing attitudes rather than creating new ones from scratch.
