The deal has drawn complaints about congestion in Nicosia and the crossings left out, while political parties said it fell short of expectations.

What was agreed?

At a meeting under UN auspices in Nicosia, the two leaders agreed to open a crossing linking occupied Louroujina with Lympia and another linking Kampos with occupied Karavostasi. The UN said the two would open simultaneously, and Christodoulides said that would happen on the same day after the necessary preparatory work. No date has been given.

Where are they?

Louroujina sits in a salient that marks the southernmost point of the occupied north, separated from the government-controlled area by the UN buffer zone. Kampos is a mountain village in the Nicosia district near Kykkos Monastery, and Karavostasi lies about 6 kilometres north of Lefka. The UN statement did not give exact locations for the crossings.

How far are they from the main cities?

In a straight line, Louroujina is about 20 kilometres from Nicosia, about 19 kilometres from Larnaca and about 53 kilometres from Limassol, while Lympia is about 27 kilometres from the capital. Karavostasi is about 48 kilometres from Nicosia, about 16 kilometres from Morphou and about 54 kilometres from Limassol in a straight line. Kampos is between 70 and 90 kilometres from Nicosia, according to published figures, and about 33 kilometres from Morphou.

Why these two?

Both were among four crossings on the table ahead of Monday’s meeting, along with Mia Milia and the Athienou-Pyroi-Aglandjia route. Greek Cypriot negotiator Menelaos Menelaou told CyBC on 21 October that Turkish Cypriot insistence on Louroujina-Lympia was the outstanding obstacle to a deal.

Sigmalive reported last week that Kampos-Karavostasi had been proposed in place of a crossing at occupied Kokkina, to sidestep one of the most difficult issues in the talks. Asked on Monday whether Kampos was an alternative to Kokkina, Christodoulides said Kokkina remained on the table and was among the Greek Cypriot side’s 19 proposals.

Who stands to benefit?

The Kampos community leader, Ioannis Papadopoulos, told Politis Radio last week that a crossing to Karavostasi would end the isolation of the village, which he said now has about 160 residents. He said it would cut journeys by at least 15 to 20 minutes and that the existing road has 256 bends.

Louroujina residents protested in 2020, demanding a crossing to Lympia that reports at the time said would give them faster access to Nicosia.

Will they ease the queues in Nicosia?

The Turkish Cypriot “mayor” of occupied Nicosia, Mehmet Harmanci, said on Monday they would not. Most of the city’s vehicle traffic would stay at the Agios Dometios crossing point, where people wait for hours, he said. In February he estimated that about 60 to 70 per cent of movements were concentrated in Nicosia.

Harmanci wants a crossing at occupied Mia Milia, which Erhurman said in February would ease congestion at Agios Dometios and help both communities. The UN statement gave no traffic estimates.

Why are some people unhappy?

AKEL said the progress on confidence-building measures and the commitment to a new trilateral meeting were a positive step for the climate between the two communities. But it said the announcements on crossing points, both in number and location, fell short of the expectations raised in previous days. The party said Monday’s announcements must be matched by steps on the substance of the Cyprus problem, since the final goal remains resuming negotiations from where they stopped in 2017.

The Movement of Ecologists – Citizens’ Cooperation said the meeting did not produce the expected results because of what it called the intransigence of the Turkish side. The party said the two crossings may make movement easier but could in no way be considered part of a solution. It said they gave the impression of being opened only to meet the formal conditions set by UN envoy Maria Angela Holguin for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to hold a 5+1 conference before his departure.

The Ecologists also claimed that Christodoulides had broken a promise to Tillyria residents to open Kokkina before any other crossing, and said Erdogan and Fidan had declared, as the meeting took place, that the Cyprus problem was a Turkish national cause and that the only solution was partition.

Volt Cyprus welcomed the two crossings, the restart of the Imagine Project and stronger bicommunal cooperation, but said it had taken a year and a half of discussions to agree measures that should be taken for granted. It said Nicosia still has one crossing point, despite an appeal by the city’s mayors to ease congestion, and that this burdens residents of Agios Dometios. Steps that improve daily life are welcome but cannot be presented as real progress on the Cyprus problem, the party said.

Volt said Holguin’s recent remarks on the absence of political will left no room for complacency, and called on the two leaders to abandon tactical manoeuvring, agree on methodology without new preconditions and return to substantive negotiations on the basis of the Guterres framework and a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality.

Harmanci said bolder and more permanent steps had been expected from the two leaders, and that confidence-building measures were not meeting people’s most urgent needs.

The Municipality of Polis Chrysochous and the Tillyria Communities Complex said last week that a crossing at Kampos could not replace one at Kokkina. “There can be no new agreement on crossing points that bypasses the Kokkina crossing,” said Nikos Kleanthous, president of the complex and of the Kato Pyrgos Community Council. Holguin was reported to have told Politis that Kokkina had never been an option, while Christodoulides said before Monday’s meeting that it had always been on the table.

The Athienou-Pyroi-Aglandjia route, which Politis reported could significantly shorten journeys between Larnaca and Nicosia, was also left out. Christodoulides said discussions on it had reached no final outcome.

What happens next?

The UN said talks on other crossing points, and on methodology and substance, would continue in the period ahead and at a trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary-General in the coming weeks.

AKEL said the priority should be securing the convergences recorded by the UN and moving closer to a five-party conference under the UN Secretary-General. It said it had submitted a proposed roadmap to him and briefed the National Council.

Tillyria communities have signalled protest action but have not yet announced any.

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He described the announced openings of the Louroujina-Lympia and Kampos-Pyrgos crossing points as positive, but said they would not help ease congestion in the city.

With most traffic still passing through the Agios Dometios crossing point, people face waits of several hours, with serious consequences for their daily lives, Harmanci said.

He singled out the lack of progress on opening a crossing point at occupied Mia Milia, arguing that it would benefit both communities.

The failure to find a solution shows that confidence-building measures are not meeting people’s most urgent needs, Harmanci said, adding that bolder and more permanent steps had been expected from the two leaders. Long queues at crossing points are not simply a transport problem but a real obstacle to contact between the two communities and to daily life, he said.

President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhurman agreed at a meeting under UN auspices on Monday to open two crossing points simultaneously, at Louroujina and Kampos. The UN said they also discussed opening other crossing points and that those talks would continue, including at a trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary-General in the coming weeks. Its statement did not name Mia Milia.

In February, Christodoulides said he was ready to open crossing points at Mia Milia and Kaimakli, but only if a crossing between Athienou and Aglandjia or one at occupied Kokkina also opened, so that Greek Cypriots were served as well. Erhurman said at the time that a Mia Milia crossing would ease congestion at Agios Dometios and help both communities.

Harmanci also called for a new Nicosia crossing in February, estimating that about 60 to 70 per cent of movements were concentrated in the city and saying that arrangements at Agios Dometios were insufficient. He said a unilateral step could be considered if deemed necessary. A third lane at the Agios Dometios crossing point was put into full operation in March.

The agreement came at a meeting in the UN Protected Area in Nicosia, which the UN described as positive, held under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, Maria Angela Holguin.

The leaders continued their discussion of confidence-building measures, methodology and substance, and also discussed opening other crossing points and related pending issues. Talks on those issues, methodology and substance will continue in the period ahead and at a trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary-General in the coming weeks.

The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage will share archival material and, alongside its other work, restore specific Maronite churches and an Armenian monastery, under the agreements announced in the statement.

The Technical Committee on Environment will carry out environmental projects, while the two leaders will instruct the Technical Committee on Crisis Management to create a rapid response mechanism for emergencies.

The Imagine Project will also recommence, under the auspices of the Technical Committee on Education and as prescribed by it.

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In an interview with Turkish news agency ANKA, published on Sunday, Holguin described Monday as critical for continuing efforts on the Cyprus problem and said she hoped a step could be taken on the measures this time. If nothing happens, “Goodbye, everyone. Goodbye to me, goodbye to Guterres,” she said.

If there was progress, efforts could continue next year, even after the current Secretary-General’s term ends, she said, provided the process stayed alive.

The interview took place at the offices of the UN Good Offices Mission at the old Nicosia airport in the buffer zone, after a week of contacts with both sides. At the same time, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was meeting Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhurman at the “presidential” compound in occupied Nicosia.

Crossing points and demining

Holguin said the package under discussion includes four new crossing points and the clearing of 70,000 square metres of mines on each side, near UN checkpoint No 10 in the Deryneia area.

Asked about the Turkish Cypriot side’s request for a decision on demining the whole of Cyprus, she said the process had to start somewhere, with the same area on each side. The final aim was a mine-free island, she said, but the perfect should not be the enemy of the good, and demining should not be held up because people wanted more.

According to ANKA, the Greek Cypriot side cites the presence of a Turkish tank unit in Cyprus and believes the removal of anti-tank mines should be discussed as part of negotiations on security.

On the crossing points, Holguin referred to a proposal to replace Kokkina with Kampos, saying she hoped this would help. According to ANKA, the package on which agreement is expected includes Mia Milia, the Athienou-Pyroi-Aglantzia route, Louroujina-Lympia and the Kampos-Karavostasi route.

Next steps

Holguin said the two leaders had shown political will on confidence-building measures, but expressed disappointment at the limited progress on how to restart substantive negotiations. After a year and a half to almost two years of effort, greater convergence had been expected on methodology, procedural steps and the framework for future talks, she said, adding that the process had to move step by step.

One possible scenario was a meeting of the two leaders with Guterres in a 2+1 format, followed by an enlarged 5+1 meeting with Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, she said. The leaders would first have to prepare proposals on the procedures and methodology of new talks.

Holguin identified the 5+1 meeting as the stage at which formal negotiations could begin, but said it had not been decided whether Guterres would prefer a trilateral meeting first or go straight to a 5+1. Once the package on crossing points and demining is finalised, she will brief him and discuss the next steps. She gave no date for either meeting, saying that would depend on Guterres’s assessment and schedule.

Rotating presidency

Holguin said the two sides had reached agreement on political equality on 11 December, although the report does not specify the year. The issue was more about the rotating presidency, which is part of political equality, she said, but it would be “very difficult” to ask President Nikos Christodoulides to confirm explicitly that he accepts it before negotiations begin.

The details of political equality must be worked out in the talks and not beforehand, she said. At Crans-Montana, the rotating presidency had been linked to troops and security, and there was still concern on the Greek Cypriot side that a similar link could resurface in any new negotiations.

Erhurman’s four points

Holguin called on Erhurman to turn the four points he has set out as a framework for restarting negotiations into specific proposals. According to ANKA, the Turkish Cypriot side wants, among other things, negotiations held within a set timeframe and guarantees that if they fail through no fault of its own, there will be no automatic return to the status quo.

She asked Erhurman to specify what measures he would want in such a case, and said both leaders should consider what happens if one side leaves the table. That must be prepared before any 2+1 meeting with Guterres, she said, whether separately or jointly.

She named direct trade, direct flights and direct contacts as possible options. Told that the Turkish Cypriot side’s main priority is direct trade with the European Union, she said EU participation was essential, as the UN’s role was to facilitate and put options before the two leaders.

Varosha

Holguin said she saw Christodoulides’s proposal for Greek Cypriots to resettle in Varosha, under temporary UN administration, as an attempt to respond to Erhurman’s four points. There had to be irreversible steps, she said, and placing Varosha under UN administration could be one.

She expressed doubt that the same could be said of the port of Famagusta and direct trade, and agreed that a trade arrangement based on some form of licence could possibly be revoked in future.

UN administration of Varosha would, however, bring significant financial and practical demands, she said. The UN does not have the means or logistical capacity to run an entire city, and even providing security there would require a significant budget. If the two sides agreed, the UN could ask the Security Council for funding, she said.

Implementation and guarantor powers

Holguin voiced reservations about the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, which she said she had also encountered in the peace process in Colombia. She called the approach negative, arguing that some confidence-building measures should be implemented as soon as they are agreed, as people only see that something has changed through implementation.

Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, as guarantor powers, must support whatever the two leaders agree, she said, adding that the 5+1 format offers the framework for that and that Turkey has a very big role to play.

She also spoke positively of the bicommunal technical committees, calling them a bridge between the two communities, and of a rapid-response mechanism being developed for fires and other natural disasters, so the two sides can act jointly and immediately without first having to make 15 phone calls.

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The website’s operators have placed him on a long list of officials and other public figures who, in their view, have acted against Ukraine’s national interests. In his entry, they ask law enforcement authorities to treat the publication as a complaint that he has knowingly committed acts against Ukraine’s national security, peace, the security of humanity and the international legal order, as well as other offences.

Phileleftheros repeatedly tried to reach Panayiotou by phone and an associate of his in writing for comment, but received no response.

The entry

The entry, dated 6 November 2026, was traced by Phileleftheros, which had also found a Russian-language report on the listing. Beneath his name and date of birth, the website accuses him of taking part in acts of humanitarian aggression against Ukraine, manipulating information of public interest, spreading Russian propaganda narratives, joining the information and propaganda activities of what it calls the Russian aggressor, and publicly supporting Russian aggression.

The website then lists published news items that it says show his actions and positions relating to the Kremlin since his election as an MEP. It refers to two trips to Russia, in 2023 and 2025, during which, according to its operators, he visited Red Square and met Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of the Russian State Duma and a member of the ‘United Russia’ party.

The entry also cites statements he allegedly made on sending weapons to Ukraine, as well as what it calls a controversial position on the displacement of children from Ukraine. It further refers to a related resolution on minors and the stance he took on it.

Criticism of the website

Myrotvorets has not been officially linked to the Ukrainian government, and its database of personal details of politicians, journalists and other officials has drawn protests from official bodies around the world.

On 2 June 2016, ambassadors of the G7 countries expressed deep concern over the mass publication of journalists’ personal data on the website. In a statement carried on a UK government website, they said it ran counter to Ukrainian law, under which personal data may be made public only with the person’s consent.

Reports from the end of the last decade to the present show that the European Commission, the European Parliament and the OSCE, among others, have intervened, calling on the Ukrainian government to address the issue and investigate possible illegality.

According to a UN document dated 11 May 2026, Ukraine informed the UN Human Rights Committee that it had opened a consolidated criminal case into the illegal collection and dissemination of personal data through the website.

European media reports have at times linked the website to former officials of Ukrainian agencies, and its operators have been criticised for restricting freedom of expression.

The meeting is expected to show whether Erhurman is ready to accept a package of confidence-building measures, which will decide the prospects of a deal. Its outcome will also determine whether a wider meeting in the 5+1 format can take place, opening the way to substantive negotiations.

In interviews over the weekend, Holguin sent a series of messages to both leaders, warning that failure to produce a result on Monday would be a missed opportunity.

Warning over 5+1

Speaking to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper ‘Yeni Duzen’, Holguin said a package of confidence-building measures was being prepared for Monday’s trilateral meeting but was not yet ready, and that this depended on the leaders.

“If there is no result, there will be no 5+1 meeting,” she said, explaining that a successful 5+1 was very important to the Secretary-General and that a bad meeting could further complicate matters between the two leaders.

Talks between the leaders had produced positive results that must now be set down in a text, she said, adding that efforts were focused on creating the conditions for negotiations and that confidence-building measures were the first step.

If nothing emerges on Monday, she said, she will write her report to the Secretary-General, as her term ends in December, and he will explain the state of the Cyprus problem to his successor. She nevertheless said she was optimistic about the confidence-building measures, while noting that the political deadlocks between the two sides were not expected to be lifted on Monday.

Asked about the Secretary-General’s seven points, which Erhurman cites, Holguin said they were proposals by the leaders. She referred to the 2025 meeting in Geneva, where four crossing points, solar panels in the buffer zone and the Bicommunal Youth Committee were raised, and said the Secretary-General had reminded them of those seven points. Asked about the 19-point package from Christodoulides, she said it was not in their hands.

On the timing of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to the island, she said she honestly did not know how to interpret it, noting that there were also elections.

Risk of failure

Holguin told the ‘Sunday Mail’ that another failure of the Secretary-General’s initiative would do huge damage to the effort to restart negotiations and have serious consequences for the prospects of a solution. She described the current initiative as a significant opportunity to restart the process, saying its loss would make efforts harder.

The Secretary-General did not want to hold a 5+1 meeting without good preparation, she said, because there was a sense that each failed meeting had further widened the differences between the two sides, and this time things had to be different.

As a possible way out of the deadlock over the rotating presidency, she suggested that negotiations begin without preconditions but with that issue first on the agenda. That would establish from the outset whether agreement was possible, she said, rather than spending months in talks before addressing one of the main points of disagreement.

Process and agenda

In an interview with the newspaper ‘Politis’, Holguin said the two leaders must agree on a clear process before substantive negotiations begin, with a specific timetable, an agreed agenda and mechanisms to overcome any deadlocks.

She said the six points presented by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres at Crans-Montana could form the basis of the agenda. “The perfect agenda is the six points. Call it what you want,” she said.

School curricula place such strong emphasis on national, moral and cultural values that these take precedence over scientific, evidence-based learning. Religious groups are gaining increasing influence in schools, while Turkey’s entertainment industry is reshaping the country’s history to fit the narrative promoted under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The propaganda machinery is built at home before being exported across the world. Africa and Asia are the main priorities, but South America and Europe are also targets.

What the European Commission found

The Commission’s 2026 report may not use the word “Islamisation” to describe Erdogan’s Turkey, but its findings speak for themselves.

Education increasingly shaped by national and religious values

The “Century of Turkey Education Model”, a skills-oriented curriculum introduced in 2024, is being implemented gradually and already applies to grades two, six and nine.

The strong emphasis on national, moral and cultural values in the new curricula takes precedence over scientific and evidence-based learning.

Vocational education and training schools and religious schools account for approximately 40.6% of enrolments in Turkey’s upper secondary education, with persistent gender imbalances.

Religious organisations gaining influence in schools

The Ministry of National Education is increasingly allowing religious groups and structures linked to tarikats, or Sufi religious orders, to influence the education system.

According to the Commission, this trend threatens to undermine secular, high-quality education and weakens mechanisms for oversight and accountability.

A ministry circular issued in February 2026 concerning Ramadan activities in schools reignited debate about secularism and pluralism in education.

The education minister initiated legal proceedings against intellectuals and civil society organisations that had spearheaded a declaration supporting secularism.

The ministry also renewed a protocol with a youth foundation, allowing it access to thousands of state schools during the summer holidays to provide religious classes, despite Turkey’s Council of State having previously annulled a similar agreement.

Atheists and agnostics face discrimination, stigma, social pressure or restrictions on their right to education.

Turkey’s education system does not guarantee neutrality and impartiality towards different religions, denominations and beliefs.

No measures have been taken to address shortcomings identified by the European Court of Human Rights concerning compulsory religious culture and ethics classes.

During the reporting period, children from Protestant families were required to choose one of four optional Sunni religious courses, despite being entitled to an exemption.

Cultural diversity and independent voices under pressure

In the cultural sector, structural problems persist despite increased activities and festivals at national and local levels, as well as investment in infrastructure.

These problems particularly concern support for cultural diversity and institutional coordination.

The wider environment continues to undermine pluralism and leaves little room for independent organisations and critical voices.

Public spending on culture remains relatively low.

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism continued promoting large-scale events without ensuring transparent participation by stakeholders.

Political interference and arbitrary bans on events continued.

Implementation of UNESCO’s 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions remains slow, with no substantial new measures.

Turkey does not participate in the Creative Europe programme for 2021–2027.

These are the developments taking place within Turkey itself.

But Ankara’s activities do not stop at its borders. It has built a well-organised propaganda apparatus designed to export Turkish “culture” in every direction.

The entertainment industry: Ankara’s first step

In the early 2000s, Turkish television series generated approximately $10 million a year in overseas revenue.

Today, export earnings exceed $1 billion, while Turkish productions reach more than one billion viewers in 170 countries, according to Ankara.

Turkey claims to have one of the world’s three largest television industries.

Interest in Turkish content increased by 184% between 2020 and 2023.

The industry operates along two parallel tracks.

The first is commercial: private studios selling melodramas to audiences in Latin America, the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Africa.

These programmes do not necessarily convey an ideology. Instead, they create familiarity with Turkish homes, Istanbul and the Turkish language.

The second track is state-driven.

Historical epics produced by the public broadcaster TRT, including Dirilis: Ertugrul, Kurulus: Osman and Payitaht: Abdulhamid, add an ideological narrative.

Ertugrul was sold to 71 countries and translated into 25 languages.

During Ramadan in 2020, more than 130 million people watched it on Pakistan’s state television network.

The series became a screen onto which an entire nation projected its dream of a transnational Muslim community.

Through these productions, Turkey is attempting to rewrite history as it sees it today, rather than as it actually happened. It is constructing its own narrative and promoting it internationally.

The state pays the bill

In February 2026, Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy announced subsidies of up to $100,000 per episode for television series sold abroad.

The eligibility criteria are revealing.

A series must have been broadcast in at least three continents and 10 countries.

It must contribute to promoting Turkey and spreading the Turkish language.

And it must be filmed in tourist destinations selected by the state.

The minister himself described Turkish television series as “the world’s biggest Turkish-language lesson” and said their leading actors would become “tourism ambassadors”.

In August, the Presidency’s Directorate of Communications organised an event titled “The global narrative of Brand Turkey: Turkish TV series”.

The institution accused by the European Commission of political bias is now openly claiming television dramas as one of its own instruments.

Turkey builds its own streaming platform

Ankara does not want to depend on Netflix.

In May 2023, TRT launched its own global streaming platform, tabii, with then-presidential communications director Fahrettin Altun attending the launch.

The languages offered in its first phase tell their own story: Turkish, English, Spanish, Arabic and Urdu.

In other words, the Americas, the Arab world and Pakistan — markets that had already embraced Ertugrul.

The entertainment industry is the first door.

It requires no permission, needs no agreements between governments and enters people’s living rooms before anything else.

And when Ankara’s narrative is challenged, it does not hesitate to apply pressure.

In 2024, following protests by Turkey’s Foreign Ministry, Netflix suspended the international release of Famagusta, a series about the 1974 invasion of Cyprus.

Ankara’s 17 arms of influence

Behind every Turkish school in the Sahel, every mosque in the Balkans and every Turkish television series broadcast in Pakistan stands a state institution.

There are at least 17 of them.

In 2026, the organisations operating abroad have a combined budget of approximately €475 million, excluding TRT’s international operations.

The entire Turkish Foreign Ministry has a budget of around €835 million.

In other words, Turkey spends more than half the equivalent of its diplomatic budget on soft power.

The schools: Training future generations

The Turkey Maarif Foundation was established in 2016 following the attempted coup, with one objective: to take control of schools abroad associated with the Gulen movement.

A decade later, it operates 524 schools in 66 countries, educating more than 75,000 pupils.

This year, it receives up to €134 million from Turkey’s education budget.

It is the same budget that, according to the Commission, leaves 804,000 children out of school within Turkey itself.

Africa is the main arena.

The method is straightforward, as the foundation’s own representatives have explained.

Identify the best pupils, immerse them in Turkish language and culture, and send them to study in Turkey.

There, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) awaits them with its Turkey Scholarships programme.

Around 5,000 scholarships are available each year. In 2026, some 200,000 young people from 164 countries applied.

The chain begins in a kindergarten in Nairobi and ends in a ministerial office where Turkish is spoken.

The imams: Religion as an instrument of influence

The Diyanet, Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs, is the largest of these institutions, with a budget of approximately €3.1 billion, although most of the money goes towards salaries within Turkey.

Abroad, it has 77 religious counsellors, 54 religious attachés serving at embassies and more than 1,500 religious officials.

Its International Imam Hatip Programme brings almost 2,000 students from more than 110 countries to Turkey.

The most recent African summit of religious leaders organised by Diyanet in Istanbul attracted muftis and religious affairs ministers from 52 countries.

Religious communities, known as cemaat, operate alongside the state.

Organisations such as the Hudayi Foundation and the Suleymancilar run Islamic religious schools in Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger and Nigeria.

This is the international face of the trend the European Commission identifies within Turkey’s own schools: the state and religious orders working within the same framework.

Language and development aid

The Yunus Emre Institute, Turkey’s equivalent of Germany’s Goethe-Institut, has a budget of approximately €41 million this year.

It is opening new centres in Latin America despite a fraud scandal that led to the arrests of officials.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has around 60 overseas offices and, together with its development cooperation programme, manages approximately €165 million.

It builds hospitals and schools, restores Ottoman monuments and distributes food during Ramadan.

This year, its Ramadan food assistance reached 600,000 people in 89 countries.

Every project carries a Turkish sign and flag.

The occupied north of Cyprus as a testing ground

These organisations are already active in the occupied north of Cyprus.

TIKA opened an office in Nicosia in December 2019, with the leadership of the breakaway administration describing its projects as intended to “preserve and promote the Turkish presence”.

The Yunus Emre Institute also operates a centre in Nicosia.

In 2011, the Hala Sultan School opened as the first Islamic religious secondary school in the occupied part of Cyprus, despite objections from secular Turkish Cypriots.

Alongside it, the Diyanet Foundation built the Hala Sultan Mosque, modelled on the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne.

The mosque has a capacity of 7,500 worshippers.

It stands on the road from Tymbou airport, positioned so that every visitor can see it.

In interviews with the Sunday Mail and Politis, Holguín urged the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to agree on a clear negotiating process, including a timetable, agenda and mechanisms for overcoming deadlocks, before substantive talks resume.

Speaking to the Sunday Mail, she warned that another failure would seriously undermine the prospects for a settlement, describing the current UN initiative as an important opportunity that should not be lost.

“There will be enormous damage,” she said.

“That is why the UN Secretary-General does not want to proceed with a 5+1 meeting without proper preparation. Things must be different this time, because the feeling is that every failed meeting has widened the differences between the sides even further.”

Holguín also suggested a possible way around the disagreement over a rotating presidency.

She proposed that negotiations begin without preconditions, but with the issue placed first on the agenda. This would allow the two sides to establish from the outset whether an agreement is possible, rather than spending months negotiating before addressing one of their main differences.

Asked about the 19 proposals submitted for discussion by President Nikos Christodoulides last September, Holguín told the Sunday Mail that she had not received a written document outlining them.

She also questioned Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman’s proposed approach to negotiations.

“What Tufan calls methodology is not methodology,” she said.

Holguín explained that a negotiating methodology should set out the procedural steps, timetable, agenda and arrangements for dealing with potential deadlocks.

Six points from Crans-Montana could form negotiating agenda

In her interview with Politis, Holguín stressed that both leaders must agree on a clearly defined process before substantive negotiations can begin.

This should include a specific timetable, an agreed agenda and mechanisms to help overcome disagreements.

She suggested that the six points presented by UN Secretary-General António Guterres during the Crans-Montana negotiations could provide the basis for the agenda.

“The perfect agenda is the six points. Call it whatever you want,” she said.

Asked about the UN document recording the convergences reached during the 2015–2017 negotiations and at Crans-Montana, Holguín said she did not intend to give it to the two leaders before talks began.

She explained that she wanted to avoid disputes over its contents that could revive tensions, as had happened with previous UN documents.

Domestic politics and lack of political will remain obstacles

Holguín also identified domestic politics as one of the biggest obstacles to resolving the Cyprus problem.

Elections and political considerations, she said, affect leaders’ ability to make decisions.

Asked whether political will was lacking, she answered yes, making clear that the problem applied to all sides.

In that context, she raised the possibility of Greek Cypriots considering even a short postponement of the presidential election if they believed it could help achieve progress.

Holguín also acknowledged that the weight of the past continues to affect both communities and efforts towards a settlement.

She posed a fundamental question for the two leaders: whether they want to return to the strong federation that had been under discussion at Crans-Montana.

“What is your destination port? If you know what your final destination is, it is much easier to get on board. This discussion must take place between the two leaders,” she said.

Her remarks underscored the importance of establishing a shared understanding of the outcome both sides are seeking.

Drawing on her experience of peace efforts in Colombia, Holguín said that even after a painful past, it was essential to look towards the future and the next generation.

“I don’t want to sound naive. I know how difficult the past is. But sometimes, even with that past, you have to think that life must be different. I wanted a different country for my son, but also for myself,” she said.

Holguín also noted that regional developments have made the Cyprus problem more complicated, with more actors involved, each pursuing their own interests.

Some, she suggested, might prefer to maintain the status quo.

Nevertheless, she stressed the need to make use of the current opportunity, warning that another failure would come at a significant cost to the prospects of restarting negotiations.

The “blue tsunami” that swept across American politics, delivering Democratic victories even in longstanding Republican strongholds such as Texas and Kansas, represents a serious political blow to the US president.

The new balance of power in Congress deprives Trump of his ability to push through his legislative agenda without obstruction, while giving the opposition powerful tools to scrutinise his administration.

The crucial question for the rest of the world is whether this political upheaval will remain confined to domestic affairs or also reshape US foreign policy, particularly Washington’s handling of the wars in Ukraine and Iran and their wider consequences.

Three experts with extensive experience of American politics spoke to Phileleftheros about the election results and their potential implications for US domestic and foreign policy: Evripidis L. Evriviades, Marios Lysiotis and Thodoros Tsikas.

Evriviades and Lysiotis both served as Cyprus’s ambassadors to the United States, while Tsikas is a Greek political scientist and international relations expert.

Lysiotis was Cyprus’s ambassador in Washington from 2018 to 2023, serving during Trump’s first term in the White House. Evriviades held the post from 2003 to 2006, a particularly significant period that included the Annan Plan and Cyprus’s accession to the European Union.

Evripidis Evriviades: Trump’s presidency has an expiry date, but Trumpism is here to stay

Donald Trump’s electoral weakening at home could push him towards an even more assertive and unpredictable foreign policy, former Cypriot ambassador Evripidis L. Evriviades told Phileleftheros.

Despite the Republicans’ heavy defeat in the midterm elections, Trump retains considerable presidential powers, he warned, while the political influence of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement will not necessarily diminish when his presidency ends.

Evriviades believes the economy and cost of living played a decisive role in shaping voting behaviour.

“For many, the answer was in their pockets. Food, housing, healthcare, petrol and, yes, the price of eggs. Eggs had become a symbol of the cost-of-living crisis. Trump had promised to bring down the cost of living. Did he keep his promise?” he asked.

Americans voted primarily on the issues affecting their everyday lives, Evriviades argued, but the consequences of their choice extend far beyond US borders.

He said the scale of the Republican defeat was considerably greater than the losses traditionally suffered by the governing party in midterm elections.

Although Trump will remain in the White House until January 2029, Evriviades does not believe he will necessarily withdraw from political life afterwards.

“He may be considered a ‘lame duck’ in American political terminology, but perhaps he is more like a wounded lion. And a wounded lion can be dangerous,” he said.

At the same time, Trump’s political influence extends beyond the presidency itself.

“His political influence extends beyond the presidency. It also rests on the movement that has transformed the Republican Party in his own image,” Evriviades said.

“The Trump presidency has an expiry date, but Trumpism is here to stay.”

He also pointed to the way Trump’s willingness to challenge established norms, confront institutions and use economic pressure as a diplomatic weapon has changed the conduct of American foreign policy.

“Unconventional methods, however, do not mean an absence of strategy. The fundamental objectives of the United States remain remarkably consistent: maintaining global primacy, preventing the emergence of a rival dominant power, preserving military and technological superiority, and using economic strength to advance national interests.

“What often distinguishes Trump is not so much the destination as the way he tries to get there. And that approach can be extremely unpredictable.”

Weaker at home, more aggressive abroad

Perhaps the greatest paradox of the election, according to Evriviades, is that a president weakened domestically could become more assertive internationally.

From January, Democratic control of Congress will bring closer scrutiny, investigations and legislative obstacles.

The Senate can block appointments, while both chambers exercise significant powers over spending and legislation.

Evriviades believes Trump may increasingly turn to his executive powers, testing their legal limits.

“Trump may pursue results that depend less on Congress: an agreement with Putin over Ukraine, an understanding with China, or a diplomatic opening in the Middle East. Alternatively, he may increase pressure on allies and adversaries. Or he could seek common ground with the Democrats on foreign policy. He often uses unpredictability as a negotiating weapon,” he said.

Asked about the wider world’s dependence on developments in the United States, Evriviades recalled an old saying that he believes still holds true:

“When America sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold.”

Europe, he said, faces the continuing challenge of strengthening its own security while dealing with a Washington that increasingly approaches international relations in transactional terms.

Ukraine must protect its interests as American and European approaches to ending the war diverge.

Russia and China, meanwhile, will look for opportunities while weighing the risks posed by an unpredictable Trump.

In the Middle East, traditionally bipartisan American support for Israel could face greater scrutiny from Congress, particularly in relation to the war with Iran.

“A fundamental reversal of this strategic relationship, however, is inconceivable,” Evriviades said.

He also stressed that foreign policy increasingly affects everyday economic life.

“Tariffs affect prices. Wars affect energy markets. Sanctions affect trade and investment. Decisions taken thousands of miles away reach into the pockets of American voters.”

For smaller and more vulnerable states, including Cyprus, the lesson is a familiar one, he argued.

“Strategic partnerships matter. American presence and involvement matter. But personal assurances cannot replace institutions, binding agreements or a coherent national strategy.”

Marios Lysiotis: Major changes in US foreign policy are unlikely

The Democrats’ sweeping victory in the midterm elections does not necessarily mean that American foreign policy will change substantially, former Cypriot ambassador Marios Lysiotis told Phileleftheros.

Lysiotis examined the potential consequences for Washington’s relations with Iran, Israel, Ukraine and the European Union, as well as Cyprus and Greece.

He noted that the president’s party losing control of both chambers of Congress in midterm elections is more the rule than the exception.

Nevertheless, the scale of the Democrats’ victory, combined with intense political polarisation, has created a new dynamic that will become particularly important after January 2027, when the new Congress takes office.

According to Lysiotis, the US president’s constitutional powers over foreign policy make any substantial change in direction difficult, even after his party loses control of the House of Representatives and Senate.

As in similar situations in the past, he believes the new political reality could encourage Trump to devote even more attention to foreign affairs, where he enjoys greater freedom of action than in domestic policy.

Lysiotis also pointed out that the president retains the power of veto, something Trump himself has highlighted.

Congress’s powers and the limits of Democratic control

Despite the president’s extensive authority, Congress, and particularly the Senate, possesses significant oversight powers, Lysiotis explained.

Beyond its authority over the federal budget, the Senate has the power to confirm senior officials and ambassadors, as well as ratify international treaties.

The importance of these powers became evident during Barack Obama’s presidency in connection with the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Congress can also hold hearings and request investigations, including into foreign policy matters.

Lysiotis expects the Democrats to make use of these powers to scrutinise the administration.

He also referred to the ability to initiate impeachment proceedings against officials, while making clear that these mechanisms do not automatically allow Congress to force changes in American foreign policy.

Congress also has powers concerning arms sales and military assistance, enabling it to influence important aspects of US foreign policy.

For Lysiotis, one of the key questions is how the Democratic Party, which is far from politically unified, will use its decisive electoral victory.

Equally important will be how Republicans manage their relationship with Trump under the new political circumstances.

All eyes on Iran

Lysiotis identified the war with Iran as the most important foreign policy issue facing Trump in the coming months.

He believes the conflict, particularly its economic consequences, contributed to the Republicans’ electoral defeat.

According to his analysis, Trump retains complete freedom of action until January 2027.

The situation will change, however, once the new Congress takes office.

Lysiotis also noted that the Iran issue is already causing political tensions within the Republican Party, adding another complication to the administration’s handling of the conflict.

In his view, the ideal outcome would be to seek a diplomatic solution, provided Iran responds accordingly.

Nevertheless, he believes no possibility can be ruled out as events develop.

Another issue requiring close attention is the future of US-Israeli relations.

Lysiotis said Israel’s image, and particularly that of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has deteriorated within the Democratic Party.

This becomes especially significant in light of the new composition of Congress and the Democrats’ strengthened position.

Ukraine, the EU, Cyprus and Greece

On relations between the United States and the European Union, Lysiotis does not expect substantial changes as a result of the midterm elections.

Ukraine, however, is an area where changes could occur, given the bipartisan nature of American support for the country.

Lysiotis noted that Trump would like to bring the war to an end, something that could also have positive economic consequences.

However, he believes achieving that objective will be extremely difficult, as demonstrated by the efforts Trump has made so far.

Turning to Cyprus and Greece, Lysiotis expressed confidence that their existing relationships with the United States would continue along the same lines.

He expects continuity in Washington’s relations with Nicosia and Athens, without significant changes resulting from the new balance of power in Congress.

He placed particular emphasis on the strong support networks Cyprus and Greece have established within Congress, which he believes will remain beneficial under the new composition of both chambers.

Thodoros Tsikas: The two wars remain in Trump’s hands

US President Donald Trump will retain considerable control over Washington’s handling of the wars in Ukraine and Iran despite his party’s heavy defeat in the midterm elections, Greek political scientist and international relations expert Thodoros Tsikas told Phileleftheros.

Asked specifically how the election result might change American policy towards the two conflicts, Tsikas said the president retains substantial foreign policy powers that Congress cannot easily restrict.

Decisions on how to manage both wars therefore remain largely in Trump’s hands.

However, Tsikas believes the new political balance in Washington could influence Trump’s decisions, particularly over Iran, as the president’s weakening domestic position could also undermine Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Netanyahu’s weakened position and the prospect of another conflict with Iran

According to Tsikas, Trump’s weakening position in the United States also weakens Netanyahu in Israel.

Combined with growing criticism of Israel from Democrats and some Republicans, this could make Trump less receptive to any pressure from Netanyahu for another military confrontation with Iran.

Tsikas believes Netanyahu would favour a new military conflict after the elections, seeking to delay the current Israeli opposition from taking power.

He also stressed that Israel’s opposition maintains very good relations with the Democrats in the United States.

It is therefore far from certain, he argued, that the Democrats would want the conflicts initiated by Netanyahu to remain unresolved.

Iran: From another military strike to a political solution?

Turning to possible developments in Iran, Tsikas said that although the most likely scenario had been for the United States to launch further military strikes after the midterm elections, those plans could now change.

Trump’s painful electoral defeat has created new circumstances that could make it more difficult for the United States to continue military operations, he argued.

Under these conditions, Tsikas believes the administration may turn towards political solutions rather than another military escalation against Iran.

Ukraine: Trump’s dilemma over a deal with Putin

On Ukraine, Tsikas expects the new Congress to be much more determined to advance measures supporting Kyiv.

The central question, he said, is how Trump will respond to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the changing political balance in Washington.

Will the American president seek to pursue an economic deal with Putin, downgrading Ukraine’s interests and attempting to resolve the conflict without involving Kyiv?

Or will he eventually adapt to the political climate in the new Congress?

Tsikas believes Trump has not yet made a firm decision.

Instead, he expects the president would prefer to allow some time to pass before deciding on his final approach, so he can assess how the political balance within the United States develops.

The crucial two months before the new Congress takes office

Tsikas attached particular importance to the period before the new Congress takes office in early January 2027.

Trump still has approximately two months during which he can act with greater freedom, before the balance of power changes in both chambers.

Tsikas believes the president may use this window to take specific actions that would become more difficult once the new Congress assumes office.

This possibility, he argued, must be taken into account when assessing Washington’s next moves, both towards Iran and Ukraine.

The Foreign Ministry has embarked on a major diplomatic effort, contacting a number of countries to brief them on the background and political record of Ankara’s candidate.

The campaign began immediately after Turkey announced his candidacy. Ankara appears to be banking on an unexpected turn in the selection process that could allow its preferred candidate to secure the position.

Sinirlioğlu’s first test in a Security Council vote is regarded as a failure, but the process is far from over.

If the selection process reaches a deadlock, efforts could be made to find a compromise candidate. For example, if the United States rejects the current frontrunners and pushes for a third option, nothing can be ruled out.

This appears to be the scenario Ankara is counting on.

Nicosia is making its position clear through diplomatic contacts in New York and other capitals, as well as interventions at the highest political level from Cyprus.

It is explaining why it believes the Turkish official should not lead the United Nations.

Its objections extend beyond Sinirlioğlu’s position, and that of his country, towards Cyprus and Turkey’s continuing occupation of part of the island. They also concern his record on other international issues and allegations about his conduct.

His actions against Cyprus

During his service as undersecretary at Turkey’s Foreign Ministry and as ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, Feridun Sinirlioğlu systematically challenged, and continues to challenge, the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, a member state of both the UN and the European Union.

In a letter dated 19 May 2022, circulated as UN document A/76/842-S/2022/405, Sinirlioğlu repeated Turkey’s longstanding claim that the Republic of Cyprus ceased to exist as a legal entity in 1963.

He challenged its jurisdiction and advocated a settlement based on two states on the island and sovereign equality.

The letter explicitly stated that he was acting on government instructions.

This is just one of numerous examples. Turkey has established what amounts to a production line of letters to the United Nations challenging Cyprus and Greece.

During his tenure as permanent representative, Sinirlioğlu also forwarded letters and documents from the representative of the breakaway entity in the occupied north, who operates from offices at Turkey’s Permanent Mission to the UN.

The positions Sinirlioğlu expressed in New York, reflecting Ankara’s official policy towards Cyprus, can be summarised as follows:

• Non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus: Turkey maintains that it does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus, despite its membership of the United Nations and the European Union.
• Challenges to Cypriot sovereignty: Through diplomatic interventions supporting Turkish violations, Sinirlioğlu challenged the Republic’s sovereignty both on land and at sea.
• Challenges to UN resolutions: Letters he submitted as Turkey’s permanent representative questioned the Republic of Cyprus and advanced arguments that undermined United Nations resolutions. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), for example, explicitly calls on states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Yet this resolution appeared to carry no weight in the arguments advanced by the Turkish candidate, who now seeks to lead the very organisation that adopted it.
• European court judgments: He also sought to challenge decisions of the European Court concerning Turkey.

The China controversy

Sinirlioğlu repeatedly criticised China over its treatment of the Uyghurs, a predominantly Sunni Muslim ethnic group of Turkic origin living mainly in the Xinjiang autonomous region of north-western China.

He raised the issue through interventions at the United Nations.

His position was linked to Ankara’s policy of presenting itself as a protector of Muslims around the world, part of an effort to portray Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a paternal figure.

However, his interventions did not substantiate the allegations he advanced, while his approach contributed to tensions between China and Turkey.

Security Council records from 27 October 2021 document a heated exchange triggered by Chinese criticism of Turkey’s conduct in Syria.

Sinirlioğlu responded by questioning the human rights records of countries that had criticised Turkey.

The relevant passage of the Security Council proceedings, however, does not explicitly mention the Uyghurs.

Afghan women’s rights

Afghan women’s organisations have accused Sinirlioğlu of showing excessive understanding towards repression by the Taliban and proposing a path towards normalising international relations without sufficiently safeguarding women’s rights.

Sinirlioğlu was appointed Special Coordinator to conduct an independent assessment under UN Security Council Resolution 2679 (2023).

The resulting report proposed a framework for international engagement with Afghanistan and a conditional path towards normalisation.

Criticism of his work has focused on the conditions under which the international community would engage with the Taliban and the place given to women’s rights within that process.

Allegations involving the Armenian Church

Sinirlioğlu has also faced public allegations that he was willing to facilitate interference in the Armenian Church.

On 23 July 2026, the Armenian Centre for Political Rights, the Helsinki Committee of Armenia, the Forum for Religious Freedom in Europe and Christian Solidarity International issued a joint statement concerning a recorded telephone conversation made public on 8 July.

The organisations alleged that Sinirlioğlu appeared willing to consider supporting efforts to remove Karekin II, the Catholicos of All Armenians and supreme spiritual leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The telephone call had been made by Russian pranksters impersonating Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

The organisations acknowledged the origin of the call but maintained that Sinirlioğlu’s apparent willingness to offer assistance was incompatible with his position as Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Allegations about his conduct

Sinirlioğlu, who serves as OSCE Secretary General, has also faced complaints about his behaviour towards colleagues and foreign officials.

These include allegations of verbal attacks, some reportedly directed at women, which appear to have been raised within the organisation following complaints from governments and individuals involved.

He has also been criticised over the way he presented the assessment of elections in Georgia.

Beyond these allegations, Sinirlioğlu has been accused of advancing Turkey’s bilateral interests while serving as OSCE Secretary General.

Critics point to his interventions on various international issues, including Ukraine and Hamas, as examples of this approach.

Athens’ role

Greece currently holds the presidency of the UN Security Council, giving it considerable scope to intervene in the selection process.

This also presents Athens with an opportunity to correct what was a mistake: its previous support for Sinirlioğlu’s appointment as OSCE Secretary General.

Turkey is evidently using that appointment as a stepping stone towards the next stage in the 70-year-old official’s career.

As a Security Council member, Greece has several ways to help prevent Ankara’s candidate from securing the top UN post.

Following the latest developments surrounding the Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum, Athens also has grounds to oppose his candidacy openly.

The Republic of Cyprus has begun intensifying its own efforts, mobilising its diplomatic resources and using every available channel.

Sinirlioğlu’s election would not merely reward Turkey, the occupying power, and provide it with another opportunity to rehabilitate its international image.

It would also spell the end of any meaningful prospects for resolving the Cyprus problem.

The implications for Cyprus and the Cyprus problem of having Feridun Sinirlioğlu as UN Secretary-General are not difficult to imagine.

It would be the end.

Cyprus problem: A possible next step, but no guarantee of progress

Discussions on the Cyprus problem are currently focused primarily on opening additional crossing points.

Nicosia is attempting to keep the diplomatic process moving by exploring different options and issues that could create opportunities for further steps.

The Turkish side, however, wants to avoid substantive discussions on the Cyprus problem and concentrate instead on confidence-building measures.

Even then, it is not prepared to discuss every confidence-building measure. Varosha, for example, remains off the table.

Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres is seeking an opportunity to convene a meeting, initially between President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman, before leaving office.

His aim appears to be to leave his successor a diplomatic process that can continue after his departure.

That is what seems to concern him most, particularly as any agreement to open new crossing points would not be implemented until after he steps down as Secretary-General.

The real objective, however, should not be to secure an agreement before Guterres leaves office, but to ensure continuity in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

Nicosia has attempted to offer ways forward, facilitate the diplomatic efforts and achieve a result.

But it takes two to tango.

And the second partner, the Turkish side, is currently nowhere to be found when it comes to the bigger picture.

These efforts are clearly taking place in an atmosphere of tension rather than favourable diplomatic conditions.

That tension is linked both to the Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum and to expected developments concerning the Crete-Cyprus electricity interconnector, particularly Turkey’s anticipated response.

Even a single step forward would be significant, informed sources say.

But it is equally clear that one step will not be enough. There must be a continuation.

If Turkey genuinely wanted to move the process forward, it could have acted earlier rather than waiting until the last moment.

It could, for example, have done so before the European Commission published its report on Turkey’s progress.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to the occupied north on Friday also carried a message: Turkey is in charge.

Of course, he did not need to travel there for everyone to understand that. But his visit served as a friendly reminder.

British diplomatic presence in Cyprus

Delegations from Britain’s Foreign Office and its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York visited Cyprus last week.

Among other engagements, the British diplomats visited the headquarters of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), where they met UN representative Khassim Diagne.

The peacekeeping force’s leadership briefed the British officials on developments in the buffer zone, with particular emphasis on recent incidents.

British officials have linked the visit to the UN Secretary-General’s report on UNFICYP, which is due to be circulated in January.

However, the report was not the only reason the two British delegations travelled to Cyprus from London and New York.

The visit also provided an opportunity to discuss other matters concerning Cyprus, the Cyprus problem, the British Sovereign Base Areas and developments across the wider region, particularly events in the surrounding area.