The clock is now ticking on a series of developments that will prove critical for Cyprus’s and Greece’s relations with Turkey. The laying of the cable for the Greece-Cyprus-Israel electricity interconnector, the expected passage of the bill enshrining Turkey’s revisionist “Blue Homeland” doctrine and continuing tensions all suggest this will be more than a diplomatic test, and that the region is entering a period of intense pressure and potential military provocation.
The Republic of Cyprus is focusing its attention on the dispute over the interconnector. In an interview with Phileleftheros, Spyros Katsoulas, assistant professor and coordinator of the International Relations and European Affairs programme at the American College of Greece, argues that for Nicosia, what is at stake is ending its energy isolation and protecting its sovereign rights, with all eyes on how Turkey will react.
“The prospect of extending the interconnector to Israel gives tangible substance to the trilateral strategic partnership, heightening Turkey’s fear of encirclement. A first test is expected at the end of October, when surveys are scheduled to resume, although delays should not be ruled out,” he says.
For now, he does not see the tension as out of control, but says the risk of further escalation remains real. “The greatest danger is getting trapped in an armed incident that leads to a situation where the cost of backing down becomes prohibitive, particularly while closed channels of communication feed security dilemmas. For now, Ankara appears to prefer keeping the rhetoric high without tipping into a crisis and opening a new front with unpredictable consequences,” Katsoulas warns.
The prospect of “Blue Homeland” becoming law is also significant. As Katsoulas points out, such a move would create no new rights for Turkey under international law, but could give Ankara stronger domestic cover for putting its claims into practice. For Cyprus, that could mean fresh pressure on its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and its energy activities.
At the same time, upheaval in the Middle East is widening the uncertainty. The Mecca Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan appears to be part of a security architecture still taking shape. It could strengthen Ankara, but it also exposes real contradictions between the partners. Amid these shifting balances, Cyprus and Greece’s cooperation with Israel is emerging as a strategic counterweight, although it does not remove the risk of being drawn into conflicts driven by different priorities.
Is there a risk that tension between Greece and Turkey could reach breaking point, or even direct conflict?
The “calm waters” policy, which began with the Athens Declaration in December 2023, came to an end in August 2026. You only have to look at what has been happening in Aegean airspace since August, with violations and mock dogfights back at levels we had not seen since 2023. But assessments need to stay level-headed: tension is high, but not out of control. The first tests in the long geopolitical marathon ahead of us are expected by the end of October.
We are living through an international system in transition, where old certainties are fading and shifts in power are causing constant turbulence. The eastern Mediterranean is at the centre of these developments. At times it will spark unrest, and at others it will absorb the fallout from regional crises. The wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran, the crises in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, the challenge to American hegemony in the Middle East and the rise of China are changing everyone’s calculations, from the major powers to middle-ranking and smaller regional ones.
What does that mean for Greek-Turkish relations?
In this context, Greek-Turkish relations swing between periods of high tension and fragile détente. “Calm waters” was a tactical necessity of the moment, not a strategic choice to settle bilateral differences, on either side of the Aegean. Both countries used the time to shore up their defences, not to look for solutions, which should come as no surprise.
Today we are back in a phase of heightened tension. The marine parks, the interconnector cable and the military redeployment in the Aegean are the triggers for that tension, not its cause. The cause remains the concern raised by Ankara’s revisionist ambitions.
To come back to your previous question, though, the risk of direct conflict exists, as it always has. The greatest danger is getting trapped in an armed incident that leads to a situation where the cost of backing down becomes prohibitive, particularly while closed channels of communication feed security dilemmas. For now, Ankara appears to prefer keeping the rhetoric high without tipping into a crisis and opening a new front with unpredictable consequences.
Let me turn to the GSI. What exactly is Turkey seeking with its objections to the cable?
A European project of this size carries particular political weight. In the area east of Kasos and Karpathos, Turkey asserts continental shelf claims that ignore the effect of the Greek islands and rely on the illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum. Laying a cable, of course, is not an exercise of exclusive continental shelf rights under Article 79 of UNCLOS, so the question of tacit recognition of Greek jurisdiction does not arise.
The stakes are political. Completing the project without Turkey’s consent would weaken the “Blue Homeland” narrative and Ankara’s ambition to have a decisive say in the region. That is why it is now demanding “prior coordination”, in effect a right of approval, even though seven telecommunications cables have been laid in the same area over the past 20 years without any significant Turkish reaction.
There is also a wider geopolitical dimension. The GSI will end Cyprus’s energy isolation and connect it directly to the European grid, bypassing Turkey. The prospect of extending the interconnector to Israel gives tangible substance to the trilateral strategic partnership, heightening Turkey’s fear of encirclement. A first test is expected at the end of October, when surveys are scheduled to resume, although delays should not be ruled out.
If the work does not go ahead because of Turkish pressure, what precedent will that set?
If the work is abandoned under Turkish pressure, it will reinforce the perception that every project in the region, whether a cable, a pipeline or a survey, needs Turkish approval. Politically, the message would be that nothing moves in the region without Turkey’s consent.
It is not only the credibility of Athens and Nicosia that would suffer, but that of the European Union too. The GSI is a project of common European interest, with generous EU funding, and the French firm Meridiam is now its main investor. If a project like this is halted under pressure, every future investor will factor in the “Turkish factor”, and Ankara will be emboldened to create new faits accomplis.
So what realistic options do Nicosia and Athens have?
A realistic goal is flexibility in form without retreat on substance. The formula under discussion moves in that direction. Nexans informs Ankara for reasons of navigational safety, but without the work depending on Turkey’s consent. Permission is sought only from Athens, through the French state, since the cable lands on Crete, in Greek territorial waters and on Greek soil.
To carry weight, this effort needs European and allied backing. France is now directly involved. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Athens without the customary stop in Ankara, and the statement of support for the energy projects, show Washington’s interest in energy security in the region. They also show its preference for handling issues involving “third countries” through discreet diplomacy.
Strategic patience is also needed. A temporary pause may make tactical sense, as long as it does not turn into abandoning the goal. Deterrence has a stabilising effect when it goes hand in hand with dialogue, which is why channels of communication with Ankara must stay open. At the same time, deterrence has to be credible. That means readiness to protect lawful work, the ability to manage an incident and, above all, political will. The “Alexandros” exercise sent a clear message.
You have already touched on this. What will change if “Blue Homeland” becomes state law? Is it symbolism, or preparation for more aggressive enforcement?
It is a form of escalation that makes political dialogue harder. Such legislation would not be passed simply for domestic consumption, but to give the claims an institutional footing. Domestic legislation, of course, cannot unilaterally strip other states of rights they hold under international law.
But this is not just symbolism. A law like this could strengthen the domestic legitimacy of the policy and systematise the conversion of claims into administrative and operational action, such as issuing “permits”, using NAVTEX notices to assert claims and demanding “prior coordination”. It would also raise the domestic political cost of any future retreat. As a result, it could harden Turkey’s negotiating line further.
What would the legislation mean for Cyprus’s EEZ?
For Cyprus, such legislation would certainly not create new rights for Turkey under international law. It could, however, entrench Turkish claims at home and strengthen the domestic political cover for surveys, drilling or the obstruction of energy activities. Ankara is already demanding coordination for the cable surveys west of Cyprus as well.
Nicosia, working with Athens, needs to push for a common European stance that links the protection of the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereign rights and of energy interconnections to EU-Turkey relations. That support must have concrete political and economic substance, without ruling out targeted sanctions in response to violations. The aim is to raise the cost of obstruction and prevent new faits accomplis.
Houthis put the Mecca Agreement to the test
Developments in the Middle East are moving at breakneck speed. What does the Mecca Agreement change, and how much does it strengthen Turkey?
The agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reflects the process of shaping a new security architecture in the wider region. Countries in the region are looking for new alliances, possibly to make up for a lack of trust in American protection. Turkey strengthens its bargaining position as it emerges as a central regional player, while gaining access to Saudi capital for its costly defence programmes and new markets for its defence industry.
But this is not a solid bloc, as each state keeps both its own interests and parallel geopolitical alignments. The agreement has its limits. The three countries have different security priorities, and Turkey and Saudi Arabia retain competing ambitions for regional influence despite their current rapprochement.
The agreement has to be seen in the wider geopolitical space of the Indo-Mediterranean, from the Indian Ocean to the eastern Mediterranean. It is no coincidence that it alarmed both Athens and New Delhi. Turkey and Pakistan are trying to turn security cooperation into a bargaining chip over trade routes. But Riyadh has no reason to sacrifice its relations with Greece and India to its partners’ rivalries. That is where Greek diplomacy has room to manoeuvre, as the Greek prime minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia shows.
Egypt is another crucial factor. Ankara is courting Cairo with defence cooperation and the lure of more favourable maritime boundaries, while portraying the Greece-Cyprus-Israel partnership as directed against the Muslim world. But Cairo is keeping its options open, as its upcoming trilateral meeting with Athens and Nicosia shows. Egypt’s stance could significantly shape the new regional balance of power.
In this context, what does the activation of the mutual assistance clause after the Houthi attacks mean?
Although the clause has been activated, its operational scope, staying power and effectiveness remain to be seen. The reasons that delayed its activation have not gone away. Turkey and Pakistan would not want to lose the diplomatic capital they have built as mediators in the war with Iran, a country with which they both have complex relations. Pakistan supports Riyadh, but always on its own terms and without breaking with Tehran. The greatest test for the Mecca Agreement remains the threat of “entrapment”: partners being dragged into conflicts that are not their own.
What may have changed the picture is US hesitation. Donald Trump refused to strike the Houthis, and Washington spoke to them directly in Oman. Riyadh even turned to Beijing, asking it to press Tehran to rein in the Houthis. The Mecca Agreement is one of Riyadh’s cards, not the only one, but the agreement’s partners had to show it has substance.
Deterrence, however, is judged by whether it changes the calculations and behaviour of those it is aimed at. The Houthi crisis is the first real test. It will show how far the commitments translate into effective protection for Saudi Arabia and the deterrence of further attacks, without trapping the partners in a wider conflict.
Cyprus’s ties with Israel as a counterweight
How does the Mecca Agreement affect Israel and its strategic relationship with Nicosia and Athens?
The agreement heightens concern in Israel about Turkey’s regional influence, which part of the country’s political and strategic establishment now regards as a serious long-term threat. Fears of rival regional alignments run both ways. Turkey fears the Greece-Cyprus-Israel axis, while Israel fears Turkey’s presence in Syria and Ankara’s alliances. The agreement could also make it harder to normalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
For Athens and Nicosia, the relationship with Israel makes geopolitical sense and is strategically valuable. It acts as a counterweight to Turkish power, has American backing and brings the “Achilles Shield”. Ankara hopes that a defeat for Netanyahu on 27 October will loosen the relationship, but the Turkish-Israeli confrontation seems to have put down roots deeper than any individual leader. And Washington, which has failed to bridge the gap between its partners, may sooner or later have to choose between them.
There are risks of entrapment here too, however. Greece, Cyprus and Israel have different security priorities and different tolerance for the risk of escalation. Athens and Nicosia are mainly seeking to deter Turkish coercion and protect their sovereign rights. Israel also sees Turkey as a competitor in the wider regional security architecture, particularly in Syria, where it recently did not hesitate to launch pre-emptive strikes to head off a possible expansion of Turkey’s military presence.
These aims converge without being identical. The goal is for cooperation to translate into greater security and bargaining power for each side, with a clear understanding of shared objectives and of how to handle any escalation.
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