Another serious geopolitical discussion has turned into an ideological debate.
In the midst of the Middle East war — and the extraordinary show of support for Cyprus from Greece and other European states — what dominated the conversation was not strategy but interpretation. Why did Greece send help? To protect Cyprus, or to shield the British bases?
Old grievances, it seems, are light sleepers. The faintest noise and they’re wide awake.
You might expect that a country living under occupation, sitting geographically at the heart of one of the world’s most volatile regions, and under permanent threat from Turkey, would discuss these events in strategic terms. How do we secure a lasting security umbrella? Is the current Greek government willing to take on that role? What does the response of other European states — France in particular — actually mean? What is the future of the British bases? What opportunities does the web of Western alliances open up? That sort of thing.
Instead, the conversation collapsed — again — into an ideological referendum. Some seized the moment to sneer at the sense of reassurance that many Cypriots expressed — yes, sometimes in sentimental and old-fashioned terms — at the sight of Greek frigates and F-16s overhead. Others transported us back decades, to the era when Demetris Christofias dismissively called Greece a “puffed-up cornmeal.”
Greece’s immediate response to this crisis mattered. It created, in real time, a security framework around Cyprus. It acted as a catalyst — drawing in other European states, building a broader deterrence architecture.
In plain terms: Cyprus’s security became, however briefly, a European concern. When was the last time we felt safe in this place?
For decades, Cyprus’s defence has been treated as either a problem to be solved alongside the Cyprus problem, or a subject to be kept off the agenda altogether — lest it be read as “provocation” or “a lack of goodwill.” The result has been strategic paralysis and a deep freeze, with costs at every level, including at the negotiating table itself.
Now, an opportunity presents itself: to reassess Cyprus’s risk index from the ground up.
What matters is that we look beyond the immediate crisis of a neighbouring war and focus on what is genuinely needed — a joint deterrence force, anchored in Greece and broadened through European alliances, capable of adequately confronting the permanent and enduring Turkish threat. Because when this war ends, the underlying reality will not have changed.
Cyprus will still be under occupation. Greece will still be under constant Turkish pressure. And Turkey, in recent years, has been steadily building a strategic footprint across the region — from Syria to Libya, from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean.
The question is whether we remain huddled behind the shield of “small and powerless” — or whether we seriously examine where this momentum could actually take us.
