The new crisis taking shape in the Middle East is not simply another regional conflict. Rather, it is evolving into a process of deep geopolitical realignment, with consequences that go beyond the borders of the countries involved and affect the balance of power across the entire region. At the centre of this dynamic is Turkey, a country that in recent years has sought to strengthen its role as a regional power, but which at the same time is confronted with serious risks and dilemmas.
The possible weakening of Iran, whether through military pressure or internal upheaval, could create a significant power vacuum at the heart of the Middle East, Marianna Charountaki, professor of international politics at the University of Lincoln, told Phileleftheros. As she said, for Ankara such a development could open up new opportunities for influence, but it could also trigger developments that would directly affect its own security, such as the strengthening of Kurdish forces or even the emergence of new state entities in the region.
The Kurdish issue remains one of the most critical factors shaping Turkey’s strategic choices. The possible involvement of Kurdish forces in developments in Iran, with the backing of international players such as the United States, could drastically alter the balance in the region. “The situation remains complex and Turkey is required to act with flexibility on three levels: politically, domestically; strategically, regionally; and diplomatically, internationally,” she said.
– What are Turkey’s main concerns regarding the new crisis in the Middle East? What does it stand to lose and what could it gain?
– First of all, with regard to the heart of the Middle East, it is worth noting that although the conflicts go beyond the boundaries of Turkey and Iran, they also pass through them and act as determining factors in the transformation of the region, as shaped by the “Middle East Partnership Initiative” under US President George W. Bush on December 11, 2002. The neoconservative agenda in the United States placed Turkey at the centre of American strategy, presenting it as a moderate model for the region, which others were expected to emulate through the use of political Islam and, more specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey faces significant risks, since a possible upheaval in Iran would create a power vacuum and affect the strategic prospects of the region. It would also force Ankara to confront both the possible emergence of a new Kurdistan and the simultaneous loss of its only non-Arab neighbouring state, while it would also have implications for political Islam as a mode of governance.
Important concerns also relate to Iraq and areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul, which have historically been regarded as strategic for Turkey, as reflected in the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî, January 28, 1920). At the non-state level, the Kurdish issue remains a central priority of Turkish foreign policy, with Ankara closely monitoring developments in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq while, for the time being, limiting itself to neutrality. Despite the risks, it also has opportunities to strengthen its regional influence, although the outcome of this conflict, if it reaches a conclusion, raises the question of whether the weakening of the Arab states, at least those in the heart of the Middle East, will be accompanied by a corresponding weakening of the non-Arab states, with the exception of Israel.
– Is Turkey therefore at a disadvantage if Iran is significantly weakened, or at an advantage because it has the opportunity to fill the power vacuum created by that weakening?
– Turkey faces risks because of the uncertainty created by Iran’s weakening, but at the same time it may be able to use the power vacuum to strengthen its regional influence. In the event of significant weakening, the emergence of a new model of governance in Iran could largely shape developments in the region, given its ethnic diversity and five main ethnic groups, while the new structure could create scope for strategic realignments, as was seen in the changes that followed 2003.
To play an active role in the region, Turkey must ensure that neighbouring Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and others remain cooperative, while at the same time maintaining internal stability. The open front of managing the Kurdish issue is a critical factor in the dynamics of its foreign policy. Therefore, what it does, and to what extent it is able to influence developments in the region, does not depend exclusively on the fall of the regime. Overall, the situation remains complex and Turkey is required to act with flexibility on three levels: politically, domestically; strategically, regionally; and diplomatically, internationally.
– Despite conflicting statements by the US President, the United States appears to be considering the use of Iranian Kurds as a “battering ram” to overthrow the Iranian regime. To what extent could Kurdish involvement play a decisive role in the struggle against the regime?
– Here I would avoid using the word “use”. American policy and strategy are institutionally linked to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, while Washington is simultaneously developing strategic relations with the Kurds of Syria, its only partners at the operational level. The key point is that if the Kurds are not treated as equal partners, primus inter pares, American strategy and its objectives will be put to the test. The importance of Kurdish support in US foreign policy becomes clear, as cooperation with the Kurds largely determines the effectiveness of US strategic plans in the Middle East. In addition, if it materialises, the choice by the American leadership to work specifically with the Kurds of Iran, rather than with any of the country’s other four main ethnic groups, would be of strategic significance.
The involvement of Iran’s Kurds at this stage would not be sufficient without the assistance of US forces or other strategic partners, such as the Iraqi Peshmerga, who have deep knowledge of American know-how, military equipment and experience from long-running conflicts. The central question remains how the United States, with the Kurds as strategic partners on the ground, will secure their role as a pillar for safeguarding its objectives in a multi-ethnic and geostrategically fluid environment, and how it will shape the conditional granting of Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdistan) in the form of autonomy rather than secession.
– And the question then arises: if the regime is ultimately not overthrown, what would the consequences be for the Kurds, having opened a front against it?
– As I mentioned, there are five ethnic groups, the majority of which oppose the regime. The continuity of the state cannot fail to look towards their full integration, as is already Iran’s policy. However, the base of the Kurdish political parties as well as their military units lies mainly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. If there were civil war tendencies, they would be generalised. Naturally, the Kurds are being targeted, with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq receiving regular pressure from Iran, both politically and economically, affecting its development. Iran’s use of missiles and, in particular, drones in Iraqi Kurdistan is at the very least daily and targeted. Overall, Iran will not be in a position to fully control the situation and will struggle to manage developments in full. At the same time, failure to overthrow the regime would make the Kurdish strategy more vulnerable, limiting the possibilities for autonomy or geostrategic advancement, while also casting doubt on the reliability of its external alliances.
– What would a Kurdish front in Iran backed by powers such as the United States and Israel mean for Turkey? What would Ankara’s reaction be?
– I believe this would become a matter of Turkey’s own domestic politics, a threat that would not allow it to influence developments directly. The timely management of the Kurdish issue, on terms of its own choosing, could allow it to preserve its influence in this complex strategic environment.
