Judicial independence in the European Union is not an abstract institutional ideal but the core of the rule of law and democratic legitimacy, Takis Tridimas, Director of the Luxembourg Centre for European Law (LCEL) at the University of Luxembourg, told Phileleftheros.
Tridimas recently addressed the annual conference of the Procedural Law Unit at the University of Nicosia, held under the supervision of Assistant Professor Nicolas Kyriakides.
EU law, he stressed, is clear in safeguarding judicial independence despite practical challenges. “In recent years, however, there has been a regression of the rule of law in certain Member States. For this reason, the Court of Justice of the European Union has developed extensive case law on the appointment, evaluation and dismissal of judges,” he said.
The debate is particularly relevant in Member States undergoing reform, including Cyprus, where judicial accountability and efficiency are closely tied to public trust. The EU’s role operates through institutional checks and balances, annual rule of law reports and judicial dialogue via preliminary references. Within this multi-layered system, independence and accountability are complementary, forming the foundation of a justice system that is credible, transparent and accessible.
What is the link between judicial independence at EU level and effective access to justice for citizens?
Under EU law — as in any democratic state — judicial independence and effective access to justice are interconnected guarantees of the rule of law. Together they ensure the “effective judicial protection” required “in the fields covered by Union law”, under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union.
Judicial independence safeguards the separation of powers and, ultimately, democracy. Democracy does not merely mean that the majority elects a government; it also requires that citizens’ rights are respected. That presupposes the ability to defend those rights before independent courts. Without independence, effective protection is impossible. Judicial independence is therefore the gateway to the protection of all rights. Without it, rights become empty provisions.
According to CJEU case law, adequate protection of individual rights cannot exist where access to courts is rendered ineffective — whether through procedural barriers or insufficient safeguards of independence. This is not only an obligation for Member States, but a fundamental right of every European citizen.
What are the main obstacles to ensuring independent and transparent procedures for appointing, evaluating and dismissing judges?
The primary obstacles are weak safeguards or the failure to apply existing safeguards in practice. The issue is sensitive because judicial organisation is closely linked to national sovereignty and judicial self-governance.
However, given the recent regression of the rule of law in certain Member States, the CJEU has developed substantial case law on judicial appointments, evaluations and dismissals. National frameworks must comply with EU law and with Member States’ obligations concerning the rule of law and judicial independence.
Rules governing appointment, evaluation and discipline must be clear and must not create doubts about the neutrality or integrity of the courts. Strong institutional safeguards are required to prevent such procedures from being used as instruments of political control.
Are there EU-level checks ensuring Member States meet high standards of judicial independence?
EU law includes binding standards on judicial independence, primarily developed through CJEU case law, itself informed by the principles of the European Court of Human Rights. Member States are obliged to apply EU law as interpreted by the CJEU.
Where compliance is challenged, remedies may be sought before national courts, which may refer preliminary questions to the CJEU where EU law is engaged.
The European Commission also plays a key supervisory role. Under the Treaties, it monitors Member States’ compliance with EU law and publishes annual rule of law reports assessing progress and shortcomings, accompanied by recommendations. This oversight is crucial.
How do you assess the EU’s role in promoting independent and transparent judicial systems in Member States such as Cyprus?
The EU can and should play a significant role. In Cyprus, as elsewhere, this occurs mainly through continuous institutional assessment and support for reforms aimed at improving the justice system.
The 2025 report on Cyprus recognises ongoing reforms, including reform of the Law Office and strengthened accountability mechanisms. At the same time, it highlights serious delays in the administration of justice, limited digitalisation and insufficient resources, all of which continue to undermine efficiency and public confidence.
The Commission has called on Cyprus to complete reforms and strengthen transparency and administrative capacity. Similar challenges, however, affect most Member States. Importantly, EU recommendations are linked to funding under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In Cyprus, reforms to improve judicial efficiency and digitalisation form part of the national plan and are tied to EU disbursements.
How can a judicial system maintain both judicial independence and public trust in procedures relating to appointment, evaluation and dismissal?
Independence and accountability are not opposing concepts; they coexist. A judicial system can preserve both only when procedures for appointment, evaluation, discipline and — in exceptional cases — dismissal are clearly defined by law, based on objective criteria, applied consistently and accompanied by robust procedural safeguards.
Within the European framework, the standards of the Venice Commission — an independent advisory body of the Council of Europe — are particularly influential. These principles emphasise that decisions affecting judges’ careers must be taken by institutionally independent bodies, must be reasoned and subject to review.
Constructive judicial dialogue with the CJEU through preliminary references further strengthens legal certainty.
