When Cyprus takes its maritime business delegation to India this November, it should arrive with an offer that extends beyond selling services abroad: a practical proposition for Indian shipping businesses to establish European operations on the island. Around 25 Cypriot companies are expected to join the mission. Their opportunity is to secure a share of the decisions, contracts and skilled employment generated by India’s expanding international commerce.

That would give substance to the claim that Cyprus can shape the next India–Europe trade route. Its maritime economy can help organise the trade carried along that route, earning income from ships and businesses whose cargo may never pass through a Cypriot port. This is an achievable ambition grounded in capabilities the island already sells internationally.

Two developments strengthen the case. The EU and India concluded free-trade negotiations in January 2026, and the European Commission submitted the agreement for Council approval in September. Entry into force still requires further procedures. Meanwhile, the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, envisages maritime and rail connections through the Gulf. Neither initiative guarantees additional business for Cyprus; both create reasons to build closer commercial relationships.

The distinction matters because transport geography alone is a weak business strategy. An additional port call must justify its costs and sailing time. A maritime services business can earn recurring fees wherever its clients’ vessels trade. Cyprus should therefore develop its contribution around the commercial functions it can perform competitively.

The Central Bank of Cyprus recorded €1.001 billion in ship-management revenue from non-residents in the second half of 2025. Full management and crewing accounted for more than 98 per cent of that income. The established business is international coordination: maintaining vessels, organising crews and ensuring that fleets operate reliably across jurisdictions.

Connections with India already exist. Columbia Group announced a Mumbai hub in January, with plans to recruit 220 additional staff across maritime and operational services. Fleet Management maintains offices in both India and Cyprus and participated in September’s bilateral maritime engagements. These networks provide relationships through which new ventures could develop.

They also expose a competitive challenge. India is developing its own maritime services capacity. Cyprus cannot assume that expertise offered today will remain scarce tomorrow. Its proposition must explain which functions benefit from a European base and how those functions complement work undertaken in India.

One answer is a European operating presence for Indian shipowners and maritime investors. A Cyprus-based team or joint venture could coordinate technical management, chartering support and European compliance, drawing on local professional networks. Indian partners could retain their domestic operations while obtaining a dedicated team for European business. The commercial test would be service quality and reduced operating friction.

Green shipping makes that proposition concrete. FuelEU Maritime has applied since January 2025, setting limits on the greenhouse-gas intensity of energy used by covered vessels. The EU Emissions Trading System separately requires allowances for covered shipping emissions. These obligations apply irrespective of flag; an Indian operator’s choice of registration does not remove the need to comply on qualifying European voyages.

Cypriot firms could offer Indian clients a coordinated service covering fuel-performance assessment, emissions records and the allocation of compliance responsibilities in contracts. Reliable data would also help owners assess fuel-saving retrofits and present investment proposals to lenders. The value lies in making European operations more predictable. Incorporating a company in Cyprus would not itself satisfy these requirements.

Maritime finance provides another opening. India’s GIFT International Financial Services Centre has a regulated ship-leasing framework. GE Shipping (IFSC), for example, offers operating leases under that framework. Cyprus-based owners and managers could explore transactions with such counterparties, combining vessel investment with management expertise and identifiable charter income.

A useful first project would identify the vessel, lessee and repayment cash flow before selecting a financing structure. Tax treatment, registration and lender security would require transaction-specific assessment. The purpose should be to make a viable shipping investment easier to execute, with clear responsibilities on both sides.

Port cooperation can develop alongside these services. EUROGATE operates Limassol’s container terminal, while DP World handles the port’s multipurpose and cruise facilities. India’s September delegation discussed potential Indian opportunities with EUROGATE. Terminal operations, digital systems and staff training offer areas for commercial proposals even before a new cargo service is established.

Any proposal to route additional Indian cargo through Cyprus should undergo a separate assessment of freight volumes, onward connections and total delivery costs. Separating that decision from services cooperation would allow commercially sound partnerships to proceed while the wider corridor develops.

The institutional machinery is available. Cyprus and India convened their first Joint Maritime Committee in September under their 2017 merchant-shipping agreement. November’s business mission should use that channel to identify obstacles emerging from specific transactions. A proposed management joint venture, a leasing transaction and a terminal-services partnership would each give officials a defined problem to help resolve.

Cyprus should then measure progress through recurring service revenue, skilled jobs and investment actually committed. The wider lesson for smaller European economies is that influence over trade can come from organising the capabilities on which international commerce depends. Cyprus can strengthen its position by becoming a place where Indian maritime businesses choose to run their European operations. November’s delegation should make that choice commercially persuasive.

*Dr Simran Keshwani is a political economist and Founder & Research Lead of IndiaForth, a Sydney-based strategic intelligence and advisory firm focused on India’s global rise. Her research examines industrial development, geoeconomics and international economic partnerships.

Dear Ambassador Breslow,

A warm welcome to Cyprus for you and your family. Godspeed.

At the Cyprus Forum 2026 on 30 Sept., 2026, you underlined that relations between our countries are at an “all-time high”, with an opportunity to “break new ground”. You invited us to think long term.

That invitation is worth pursuing.

Thinking long term means future-proofing Cyprus.

Our relations have evolved across successive administrations, going from strength to strength. They have acquired depth, substance and strategic significance.

In your 4 October 2026 interview with the Cyprus News Agency, you described our defence cooperation as “almost like NATO”.

Then came a striking statement: “the United States is going to protect Cyprus in the future.”

Consequential words. What might such protection entail? Deeper defence cooperation? A political commitment?

Whatever the answer, there are practical steps Washington can take now.

I have long argued that the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) should be designated a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US. Across the Middle East and North Africa, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco and Saudi Arabia enjoy this status. Extending it to Cyprus would help fill a strategic gap in America’s security architecture. MNNA carries no US security guarantee. It requires no NATO consensus. It can anchor defence cooperation for the long term.

MNNA status should be a step forward and a stepping stone towards the longer-term objective of NATO membership.

Strategic partnerships should outlast the governments that establish them.

Yet something more fundamental is at stake.

The RoC is a sovereign state with agency. A subject of international law, not an object of other states’ policies. And it must be treated as such.

Historically, Cyprus has too often been viewed through the prism of other strategic priorities: Britain. Turkey. Greece. The US. NATO. The Soviet Union. These priorities were real. Some remain so. The resulting calculations proved inimical to Cypriot interests. Sometimes with catastrophic consequences.

And then there is the anachronistic, colonial-era system of guarantors. Britain, Turkey and Greece. The system failed miserably to protect Cyprus. But who guaranteed the guarantors?

The time has come to stop treating Cyprus as a derivative of those relationships. Recent US policies are encouraging steps in that direction.

The strategic landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean is being redrawn. Greece and Turkey are important American allies. Israel, the Palestinians, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the Gulf and India are part of a wider strategic equation in which security, energy and connectivity overlap.

And Cyprus sits right smack in the middle of it all.

Cyprus brings assets to the table: EU membership, ports and airfields, regional relationships, maritime security, humanitarian and evacuation capabilities, and potential in energy, technology and connectivity. It is a dependable partner and security enabler in a region critical to US interests. Washington increasingly recognises this. That recognition is already being translated into concrete policies. The strategic partnership must now be solidified for the long term.

But geography can put us at the table. Or on the menu.

It need not determine our future. That is for us to shape.

We must invest more in education, healthcare, research, innovation and AI. Address our demographic challenges. Strengthen cybersecurity, water and energy security. Improve emergency preparedness, including wildfire prevention and response, and protect critical infrastructure. Enhance civil protection, defence, maritime and air capabilities. And make our institutions more effective, trustworthy and accountable. Root out corruption.

Future-proofing is not just about protecting Cyprus from external threats. It is about strengthening Cyprus from within.

All states pursue their interests. So does Cyprus. The opportunity lies where they converge.

But convergence is not permanent.

Governments change. Priorities shift. Alliances evolve. Yesterday’s enemy is today’s friend. And vice versa.

Cyprus needs several anchors: EU membership, an enduring strategic partnership with America, strong regional ties, and the pursuit of normal relations with Turkey.

No single patron. No single dependency. No overlords.

The freedom to choose.

And this brings us to our existential issue: the Cyprus question.

Washington supports a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality, consistent with UN Security Council resolutions. At the presentation of your credentials, you called for “a Cypriot solution for the Cypriot people”.

Quite right. That’s the way it should always have been. And that’s the way it should be. To borrow from Lincoln, government of the people, by the people, for the people.

But there is an elephant in the room. It has a name. It has an address: Turkey. A NATO member to boot. Ankara has the power to make a settlement possible. Yet its strategic importance to the West has too often shielded it from meaningful consequences for its continuing occupation of part of Cyprus. That strategic importance must not give Ankara the licence to dictate the terms of a settlement or control the state that emerges from it.

A federation must ensure that Cypriots of Greek and Turkish heritage govern together, with political equality and protection against domination by either community. Their common state must govern independently, free from external control or veto.

Washington has an interest not merely in settling the Cyprus question, but in the kind of state that emerges.

Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you described the partnership with Cyprus as “vital to American interests and to the broader transatlantic community”. A reunited Cyprus must be free to remain precisely that: a vital partner.

Foreign policy, defence and EU relations, for example, cannot be federal competences on paper alone. A reunited Cyprus must be able to decide and act.

But what if an external power could exercise a de facto veto over those decisions through its influence over one of the constituent states? The result could be paralysis. Hardly in the interests of Cyprus, the US or the EU.

Cypriots will disagree. That is normal. Their institutions must enable them to decide together. But legitimate disagreement must not become a vehicle for external control. A state may remain sovereign on paper, yet lose its independence in practice.

A federation is designed not for the days when everybody agrees, but for the days when they do not.

A settlement must be designed not for the governments we know, but for the governments we cannot know.

Mr Ambassador,

Your country marks 250 years since the Declaration of Independence. The American aspiration towards “a more perfect Union” is particularly relevant to Cyprus. The challenge is familiar: preserving the rights of the parts while ensuring that the whole can function.

You invited us to think long term.

Challenge accepted.

A sovereign, functional Cyprus would be a more consequential partner for the US and the EU and, above all, a more secure home for all its people.

A partner by choice, not by anyone else’s permission.

Cyprus is the satrapy of no one.

*Euripides L. Evriviades is Ambassador (Ad Honorem). Senior Fellow, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.

As housing affordability reaches a critical tipping point across Cyprus, leaving young professionals and middle-income families trapped between stringent commercial lending requirements and soaring market prices, state authorities, financial institutions, and policy stakeholders must embrace a transformative solution through shared ownership. Traditional housing models and conventional mortgages consistently fail to bridge the middle gap for households that earn too much to qualify for traditional social assistance yet remain priced out of open-market homeownership. By forging a robust framework combining institutional backing from the Cyprus Land Development Corporation, tailored commercial banking protocols, and secure legal safeguards, shared ownership delivers a viable, expandable pathway to broaden affordable housing access. It is time to translate this proven concept into a tangible reality that safeguards the future of housing in Cyprus.

Expanding this framework further reveals profound macroeconomic benefits for the entire island, particularly in addressing the alarming trend where talented young professionals emigrate due to the prohibitive cost of living and housing. By providing a reliable, structured entry point into the property market, shared ownership ensures that Cyprus retains its vital workforce, fostering sustainable domestic consumer spending and economic resilience rather than relying solely on foreign capital inflows or transient investment. Furthermore, the successful scaling of this model depends heavily on active collaboration between regional municipalities, from Limassol and Nicosia to Paphos and Larnaca, and the Cyprus Land Development Corporation. Municipalities can strategically leverage public land banks and incentivize developers through targeted density bonuses, ensuring that affordable shared ownership units are not pushed to peripheral, underserviced suburbs but are instead integrated into vibrant urban cores where access to employment, transportation, and public amenities is readily available.

The notion that simply building more housing is the universal solution to the affordability crisis is a misconception, as merely increasing the total number of residential units does not automatically translate to homes for local residents, especially given the prevalence of vacant, holiday, and investment properties. In high-pressure markets like Limassol, rising land and construction costs drive developers to prioritise luxury developments for foreign buyers and high earners rather than functional housing aligned with domestic purchasing power. Closing the housing deficit therefore demands more than sheer volume; it requires the targeted delivery of appropriately priced, sized, and located properties tailored to first-time buyers and middle-income families.

At its core, the shared ownership program operates on a flexible part-buy, part-rent framework where, instead of shouldering the entire financial burden of open-market acquisition from day one, an eligible homebuyer purchases a manageable initial equity tranche, typically set at forty percent of the property market value. The remaining equity is retained by an institutional body, specifically the Cyprus Land Development Corporation, while the occupant pays a low, regulated occupancy fee on that portion.

This model is designed from the ground up to empower buyers, ease financial transitions, and foster long-term stability by dramatically lowering financial hurdles. Because buyers only need a mortgage for their initial fractional share, loan amounts and monthly payments drop significantly, making qualification much more achievable based on local incomes. To further ease the initial transition, the scheme incorporates an introductory three-year grace period where no rent is charged on the Corporation’s remaining share, providing essential breathing room to build up savings and strengthen financial footing before rental obligations commence. When rent begins in the fourth year, it is calculated at a competitive rate of just two percent per annum on the remaining value, which is significantly lower than the traditional market average.

To accommodate growing families, the framework scales seamlessly to larger properties, such as a 109 square meter, 3 bedroom apartment valued at a €2,106 per square meter for a total price of €229,600. Under this structure, the buyer acquires a forty percent initial share amounting to €91,840, easily financed via a modest cash deposit and a fractional commercial mortgage, while the remaining sixty percent valued at €137,760 is retained by the Cyprus Land Development Corporation. Following the three-year grace period, the fourth-year annual rent is set at €2,755, breaking down to a highly accessible €230 per month.

Beyond immediate housing affordability, shared ownership serves as a powerful instrument for generational wealth creation and financial empowerment. Traditional renting leaves households vulnerable to skyrocketing rental inflation without accumulating any equity, locking families into a perpetual cycle of financial insecurity. In contrast, the staircasing mechanism of shared ownership introduces homebuyers to disciplined equity accumulation, teaching essential financial literacy and asset management while empowering households to steadily increase their ownership stake as their careers progress and incomes grow.

To ensure long-term housing mobility, this progressive staircasing mechanism allows purchasers to gradually buy out the remaining equity held by the Corporation in controlled increments. The cost of these additional tranches is determined by an independent open-market valuation at the exact time of acquisition, conducted by chartered surveyors registered with the Cyprus Scientific and Technical Chamber, ensuring fair pricing that reflects contemporary market conditions and enables domestic households to steadily transition from partial occupancy toward full homeownership as their financial capacity grows.

Compared to traditional public housing initiatives, which often struggled with administrative delays, rigid qualification requirements, and social isolation due to geographic segregation, modern shared ownership offers a progressive housing model. It transitions away from conventional state assistance toward a collaborative, market-aligned partnership between the public sector, commercial lenders, and individual homebuyers.

Critics often question whether traditional banks will finance shared homeownership models, but major lenders in Cyprus, such as the Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank, and Eurobank, can readily adapt by offering specialised, pre-approved fractional mortgage products supported by robust legal protocols. Furthermore, the model protects both public resources and private homeowners through tenure-neutral planning where units are integrated seamlessly within open-market residential blocks using pepper-potting spatial distributions, backed by government density bonuses and zoning incentives. Transactions are secured via registered leasehold security structured through a contract of sale deposited at the Department of Lands and Surveys alongside a long-term shared ownership lease, while anti-speculation protections enforce mandatory primary residence clauses, prohibit short-term subletting, impose multi-year lock-in periods, and grant the Corporation a strict right of first refusal to repurchase or reallocate shares to verified applicants on the social housing waiting list, ultimately securing a stable, prosperous foundation for future generations across Cyprus.

*Panayiotis Pachomiou is a Chartered Architect, B.Sc (Hons) Arch Diploma Arch RIBA

The most dangerous lesson of the war with Iran may not be about Iran.

It may be about the bomb.

Would the US and Israel have attacked Iran if Tehran already possessed a credible nuclear deterrent? Governments, including Ankara, have been asking the question.

The answer is probably no. A nuclear-armed Iran would have presented Washington and Israel with the risk of nuclear retaliation. That is the brutal logic of nuclear deterrence.

North Korea is treated differently. India and Pakistan went nuclear and the world adjusted. Ukraine relinquished the nuclear arsenal left on its territory after the Soviet collapse, only to discover the limits of security assurances.

President Erdoğan made his grievance explicit in 2019: some countries had nuclear-armed missiles, yet Turkey was told it could not. “This, I cannot accept.”

In February 2026, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan went further. Discussing the danger of a regional nuclear arms race, he said that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, Turkey might “inevitably” have to join the same race.

Turkey’s nuclear question, however, is much older than Erdoğan.

In 1955, as part of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative, Turkey became the first country to conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington under the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Separately, as part of NATO’s Cold War nuclear posture, US nuclear weapons began arriving in Turkey in 1959, while Turkish forces were trained for a nuclear role under American control.

In January 1963, months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington was preparing to remove its Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey as part of the secret understanding with Moscow that helped end the crisis.

Turkish Defence Minister İlhami Sancar demanded nuclear weapons for Turkish F-100 strike aircraft before the Jupiters left. He also sought Turkish participation aboard the new US Polaris nuclear submarines. Turkey did not get everything it wanted but did retain a nuclear role. Under the arrangement, US nuclear weapons were to be dispersed to Turkish airfields for delivery by Turkish aircraft, while remaining under American custody.

In 1966 came something more intriguing.

A secret US State Department memorandum, “Turkish Interest in Atomic Weapon Development”, reported that the head of Turkey’s Mineral Research and Exploration Institute had been asked to cooperate with General Refik Tulga and Professor Ömer İnönü in a programme to develop an “Atomic Bomb”. It also noted Turkish uranium exploration and Ankara’s reservations over safeguards for future nuclear facilities.

That was sixty years ago.

In the early 1980s, amid exceptionally close relations between Turkey’s Kenan Evren and Pakistan’s Zia ul-Haq, both military rulers, Turkish companies became conduits in Pakistan’s clandestine procurement of equipment for its uranium-enrichment programme.

In 1981, Associated Press correspondent Barry Schweid reported in The Washington Post on a secret US State Department cable describing a “covert purchasing organization” involving Turkish companies. Over the decade, Washington made more than 100 démarches to Ankara over nuclear-related technology transfers involving Pakistan.

There were also allegations that Pakistan was prepared to share nuclear technology with Turkey in return. Nuclear scholar Mustafa Kibaroğlu documented the nuclear dimension of the Evren–Zia relationship. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış wrote that Evren favoured nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. There are also accounts that Evren, and later Prime Minister Turgut Özal, were privately shown Pakistan’s secret Kahuta enrichment facilities.

A US-Turkey peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement was signed under Bill Clinton in 2000, but withheld from Congress after US agencies received information implicating Turkish private entities in proliferation-related activities. George W. Bush transmitted it in 2008 after Turkey addressed US concerns. It entered into force that June.

None of this proves a continuous Turkish secret weapons programme. But it suggests that Ankara has repeatedly avoided closing the nuclear door.

In 2010, together with Brazil, Turkey brokered the Tehran Declaration, an attempted nuclear-fuel swap with Iran that also defended the right of members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment.

That same year Ankara agreed with Russia to build Akkuyu, Turkey’s first commercial nuclear-power plant.

Akkuyu itself is a civilian nuclear-power project, not a weapons programme. Built, owned and operated by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom, it leaves Turkey heavily dependent on Russia for technology and fuel, while helping Ankara build nuclear expertise.

Five years later, Hans Rühle, a former senior German defence official, reported that Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, believed Erdoğan had ordered preparations in 2010 for uranium enrichment.

Turkey is a party to the NPT, accepts International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the Additional Protocol and, for the moment, has no industrial uranium-enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing capability.

These would seriously complicate any Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. But history shows that, when states come to regard such weapons as essential to their security, political determination can overcome technological, economic and diplomatic obstacles.

Nuclear technology also has a dual character. Japan illustrates “nuclear latency”: a state can remain non-nuclear while acquiring much of the technological and industrial capacity needed to build the bomb. A 2026 study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace assessed that Japan could probably develop nuclear weapons “within a matter of months”.

Ankara wants more reactors, greater localisation and less foreign dependence. It is developing increasingly ambitious long-range missiles. And in 2025 its navy announced NÜKDEN (Nükleer Tahrikli Denizaltı), its programme to develop a nuclear-powered submarine and master another advanced nuclear technology.

None of this amounts to a weapons programme. But capabilities create options. They expand Turkey’s nuclear optionality.

And the strategic environment is changing fast.

Israel is a de facto nuclear-weapon state, although it maintains its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity. Iran’s future course remains uncertain. The Mecca defence agreement of August 2026 places Turkey and Saudi Arabia in a new collective-defence framework with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Nothing publicly disclosed establishes a Pakistani nuclear umbrella or nuclear cooperation. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the US in July 2026.

For nearly seventy years, NATO’s nuclear umbrella addressed Turkey’s concerns.

What happens if confidence in that umbrella keeps weakening?

The Iran war may have changed the calculus.

For Turkey, the nuclear question is getting harder to avoid.

*Ambassador (Ad Honorem). Senior Fellow at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.

Consider a hypothetical Cypriot food exporter paying a packaging supplier. An email announces new bank details, and the invoice looks familiar. Before the transfer is authorised, the banking app reports that the recipient’s name does not match. The exporter now has to decide whether this is an ordinary naming difference or an attempt to divert the payment. A useful warning must help with that decision.

Cyprus already has the regulatory foundation. The Central Bank of Cyprus identified 9 October 2025 as the deadline for payment service providers in scope to offer verification of the payee. The safeguard covers ordinary as well as instant euro credit transfers within the rules’ scope. The practical task now is to make it understandable to the person paying a supplier, often while also handling customers, deliveries and staff.

The check compares the intended recipient’s details with those held for the account. The European Payments Council describes results including a match, a close match, no match and a check that cannot be completed. These are useful signals about payment details. They cannot establish whether an invoice is genuine, whether goods will arrive or whether the person requesting payment is entitled to do so.

In the exporter’s case, a mismatch deserves attention, but it does not prove fraud. A supplier may use a trading name on its invoice and a different name for its bank account. Equally, a convincing email may carry false instructions. The business needs to establish why the details differ before deciding to pay. Editing the recipient’s name merely to remove the warning would leave the original question unanswered.

A workable company rule would be to verify changes of bank details through a trusted contact established before the new request arrived. That could mean calling the supplier on a number already held in the company’s records, rather than the number in the email announcing the change. The person checking should confirm both the new account details and the reason for the change, then keep a short record of that confirmation.

The process should fit the firm. A larger business can require a second person to approve a supplier-account change. An owner working alone needs a simpler rule that can survive a busy afternoon: make the independent check before changing the saved payment instructions. Treating every routine invoice as a new investigation would consume time and encourage shortcuts. Changes to established details deserve particular care.

Banks can make this easier. A warning should distinguish a naming discrepancy from a check that was unavailable, explain what was checked and offer a clear way to correct the details or leave the payment unfinished. Guidance beside the warning should explain how to verify changed instructions independently. A prominent button to continue, beside an obscure explanation, places too much of the work on the customer.

The customer can still decide to proceed. The European Payments Council expressly says that a provider must not prevent a transfer solely because of the verification result. Other fraud controls may still apply. That makes the quality of the explanation especially important: the payer needs to understand the uncertainty before authorising the transfer.

Business payment arrangements also need care. The European Commission’s implementation guidance explains that non-consumer users may opt out of verification when submitting multiple payment orders as a package. This is not a general exemption for individual business payments. Firms using bulk files should discuss the setup with their provider and decide how new or changed supplier details will be checked within their own approval process.

Neither a successful match nor a warning promises that a fraud loss will be reimbursed. Providers have specific obligations under the rules, and responsibility for a loss depends on what happened and whether those obligations were met. Businesses should be able to report a suspected diversion promptly, preserve the relevant messages and obtain an explanation of the complaint process. A warning should never be presented as settling every question of liability.

For Cyprus, the next useful evidence would concern what happens after a warning appears. Banks could examine how often legitimate details need correcting, how frequently checks are unavailable and whether customers understand the next step. Business associations could help test sample messages with small firms. Counting warnings alone would reveal little about whether they prevent mistakes or create confusion; any claim of reduced fraud would require separate evidence.

For the exporter, money sent to the wrong account can leave less cash for wages, supplies and the genuine invoice. A brief, understandable check therefore has economic value beyond the payment screen. Cyprus should judge payee verification by whether a business owner can resolve uncertainty and pay the right supplier with confidence.

*Gustavo H. R. Pessoa is an economist and professor at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil.

On 9th October, Francesca Albanese’s latest report was published, dealing with the situation of human rights in occupied Palestine. The report received little to no media coverage in mainstream channels. It is entitled ‘Truth under the rubble’ and deals with the role of the media in the time of genocide. Perhaps not a very pleasant subject for the mainstream media. The report covers three aspects:

• the elimination of Palestinian media workers by Israel under the pretext of ‘terrorism’, aiming to silence Palestinian journalism so as to obscure its crimes and avoid accountability;
• the broader Israeli architecture of information control, censorship, propaganda, genocidal incitement and denial of Israeli crimes;
• and the role of large media platforms in reproducing Israeli narratives and normalising distortions which ultimately legitimised Israel’s war crimes.

Albanese argues that these practices facilitated the commission of genocide and undermined accountability.

Since October 2023, Israel has killed 300 Palestinian journalists and wounded 400+ others, some in indiscriminate attacks and at least 70 in targeted attacks, as reprisal for bearing witness to the genocide, and blocked the passage of ambulances to ensure they bled to death. The report records several instances of Israeli attacks on Palestinian journalists in both Gaza and the West Bank claiming that they had targeted Reuters and Al Jazeera correspondents under the pretext of unsubstantiated Hamas affiliation, so as to portray them as legitimate targets. In addition, 710 relatives of journalists have been murdered by Israel over the past three years including children as young as one year old. More than 100 Palestinian journalists were detained and tortured, and threatened with death if they kept reporting. More than 150 key media and telecommunications facilities were destroyed in targeted bombing attacks, which are regarded under international law as civilian infrastructure.

Independent Israeli media was not spared, as many outlets including Haaretz faced sanctions on the pretext of ‘delegitimising Israel’, whilst pro-government media was afforded preferential treatment. Foreign journalists were barred from entering Gaza, apart from staged visits and military embeds, and Al Jazeera was banned from operating inside Israel. Large-scale takedown requests were used to silence social media content that challenged the Israeli narrative and heavy investment was devoted to promoting pro-Israel content and suppressing pro-Palestine mobilisation. Israel paid for advertising campaigns on platforms like X and YouTube dismissing famine reports, generating millions of views before being removed after media scrutiny. Political figures engaged in hate speech and incited genocide, invoking biblical commands and foregrounding Israeli victimhood, with some public figures ironically calling for a holocaust and gas chambers to obliterate Palestinians.

Western media outlets, both public and private, often presumed authoritative and objective, reproduced Israeli narratives and provided privileged media access to Israeli officials. The BBC is identified in the report as one such outlet, using misleading Israeli terminology and statements. In the case of the New York Times, leaked guidance advised its journalists to avoid terms like genocide or ethnic cleansing and even to use ‘Palestine’ very rarely. October 7th was presented as the origin of hostilities and references to the Nakba and decades of occupation and brutalities shrank considerably, as false Israeli claims such as the beheaded babies and the infiltration of UNRWA by terrorists were amplified and reproduced unchallenged. Meanwhile, UN findings and ICJ proceedings were either underreported or disputed and Israeli officials’ genocidal statements were left unmentioned. A typical example was the BBC reporting of the murder of Hind Rajab with the headline ‘Hind Rajab, 6, found dead’. Criticism of Israel was treated as suspect and antisemitic and journalists departing from the pro-Israel narrative faced pressure or dismissal; public events were altered and documentaries withdrawn, including the BBC film on Gaza doctors.

Digital platforms such as Meta and X became gatekeepers of information on Palestine through various systems which amplified pro-Israel content and disappeared anti-Israel criticism. Following a meeting with Netanyahu, Elon Musk described expressions such as ‘from the river to the sea’ and ‘decolonisation’ as ‘genocidal’, whilst Google’s Project Nimbus provided Israel with surveillance and AI capabilities used against Palestinians. These platforms also enabled content by Israeli soldiers celebrating civilian destruction, looting and humiliation of Palestinian detainees; YouTube permitted a song describing Palestinians as rodents with lyrics including ‘One, two, Shoot’ and Google allowed ads denying the famine, discrediting UN reports about the genocide and describing the genocide case before the ICJ as blood libel. The said platforms benefited from $50m in Israeli advertising contracts. The report calls on the international community to investigate funding and partnerships of media groups and digital platforms that disseminate hatred and suppress protected expression, and to prosecute attacks against Palestinian journalists.

Genocide relies not only on destruction of lives but also on killing the truth and silencing the witness. Each one of us has a duty to uphold the truth and bear witness to the gravest crimes of this century.

The full report: https://docs.un.org/en/A/81/249

What if Donald Trump’s foreign policy is not as chaotic as it looks?

Last year, I argued that beneath the spectacle, contradictions and unpredictability, Trump’s foreign policy had an internal logic. But I stopped short of calling it strategy.

Today, I am more convinced that there is one — grand strategy in fact.

Consider the pieces.

Greenland. Panama. Canada. Venezuela. Iran and Hormuz. Tariffs. Critical minerals. Reindustrialisation. Pressure on allies to carry more of their defence burden. And, increasingly, China.

Viewed separately, these can look like disconnected episodes. Put them on the same map and a pattern begins to emerge.

No conspiracy is required. Nor a secret master plan. Elements of it are set out in the Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy. The question is whether interests, opportunities and events are increasingly converging. They are.

Once seen, the pattern is difficult to unsee.

But this did not begin with Trump.

In 1948, George F. Kennan, one of the architects of America’s Cold War strategy, observed with unusual candour that the United States possessed about half the world’s wealth with only 6.3 per cent of its population. The task of America, he emphasised, was to devise relationships that would allow it to maintain this “position of disparity” without jeopardising its security.

The world has changed profoundly since then. So has American policy. The methods changed. The purpose changed much less: American preponderance remains the strategic constant. And preponderance has never been merely military. It is economic, technological, commercial, financial and diplomatic.  

This, after all, is what predominant powers do. Britain did it before America. Others did it before Britain. History also records what eventually happened to them.

America nevertheless did something remarkable after 1945. It embedded its enormous power in institutions and alliances from which others also benefited. The resulting Pax Americana has been described by scholars as both hegemony and hegemonic stability. Benign to many. Hegemony to others.

The Marshall Plan helped rebuild Western Europe. Europe and Japan prospered under an American Cold War security umbrella. That umbrella also allowed Europeans to spend more on butter and less on guns. The US supplied dollars, markets, investment and security. The dollars also bought American goods. Prosperity and strategy reinforced each other.

American leadership worked because others had a stake in the system too.

The difference with Trump may therefore lie less in what America seeks than in how openly and coercively he seeks it.

Take Greenland. It is Arctic geography, missile defence, emerging sea routes and critical minerals. Panama is a strategic artery between two oceans. Canada means energy, uranium, minerals and Arctic space. Venezuela brings enormous oil reserves back into the strategic equation.

The agreement signed in September by the US, Denmark and Greenland illustrates the point. Without acquiring sovereignty, Trump secured expanded US military access and restrictions on military installations and sensitive investments by specified third countries. The agreement has no sunset clause. The strategic objective has largely survived the retreat from the original demand. But the threats that preceded the agreement have deepened European doubts about the reliability of American leadership.

Then look east.

Hormuz and Malacca are links in the same energy chain. Much of the Gulf oil bound for Asia passes through these maritime chokepoints. China remains heavily dependent on these sea lanes. The United States, by contrast, enjoys enormous domestic energy production, favourable geography and unrivalled global naval reach.

Add Suez, Bab el-Mandeb and emerging Arctic routes and an old strategic truth reappears: whoever can protect—or deny—access to the arteries of global commerce possesses enormous leverage.

Twenty-first-century power extends beyond geography.

Semiconductors. Rare earths. Ports. Infrastructure corridors. Supply chains. Financial clearing. Capital markets. Whoever gains the upper hand in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and space will enjoy a decisive strategic advantage.

And above all, the dollar.

After Nixon severed the dollar’s link to gold in 1971, the emerging petrodollar system further reinforced its global role.

The dollar-centred financial system gives Washington a form of power no aircraft carrier can provide.

Tariffs, too, can be more than protectionism. They can redirect investment, restructure supply chains and turn access to the enormous US market into strategic leverage. But tariffs can also raise costs at home, while rebuilding industrial capacity takes far more than political will.

The pieces begin to connect.

Secure the Western Hemisphere. Protect strategic resources and maritime access. Rebuild industrial capacity. Preserve technological superiority and energy abundance. Make allies carry more of the security burden. Protect the dollar. And, above all, prevent China from acquiring the power to overturn American global primacy.

But competition with China cannot be won by American power alone. Allies are not merely security dependants. They bring markets, technology, industrial capacity, military facilities and strategic reach. Pressuring them to assume greater responsibilities may strengthen the American position. Alienating them may do the opposite.

Even apparently separate conflicts can alter the strategic balance in Washington’s favour. Russia, heavily committed in Ukraine, has fewer resources elsewhere. Europe, confronted again by the Russian threat, is rearming and buying more US materiel—benefiting the American defence-industrial base. Regional confrontation has also weakened the ability of Iran to project power. And regional powers assuming greater responsibility in the Middle East can reduce demands on Washington.

None of this proves that these outcomes were scripted in advance. Nor does China explain every American action. Personality, domestic politics, ideology, opportunism and plain miscalculation remain part of the menu.

Grand strategy does not require choreography.

But therein lies the paradox.

American primacy was never sustained by material power alone. There was soft power too: culture, universities, technology, ideas and the promise of opportunity. The old joke captured the contradiction: “Yankee go home—but take me with you.” Allies sought American protection. Governments accumulated dollars. Investors put their money into American markets.

Underlying much of this was trust—the intangible tangible. And immensely consequential.

Power was reinforced by legitimacy and, critically, consent.

As allies are increasingly treated as clients to be pressured, markets become instruments of coercion, economic dependence turns into vulnerability, and rules become negotiable according to power, the search for alternatives begins.

Allies are hedging. Diversifying. Building alternative supply chains. Exploring other payment systems. Strengthening regional arrangements. Reducing dependence upon the United States. Even central banks are relocating or restructuring their gold holdings, as recent moves by France and the Netherlands illustrate.

Historically, the pattern is hardly new. Predominant powers have always sought to preserve their predominance. By overreaching, they can also accelerate their own decline. The ancient Greeks had a word for it: hubris.

The problem, therefore, is not that there is no grand strategy. There is.

The danger lies elsewhere.

The methods used to preserve American primacy are already helping to erode the trust, legitimacy and consent that made it sustainable.

America may win many of the transactions.

The larger question is whether, in so doing, America weakens the very system on which its indispensability rests.

*Ambassador (Ad Honorem). Senior Fellow at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.

Every year, thousands of volunteers across Cyprus put on gloves, grab trash bags, and head out to our beaches, forests, parks, and neighborhoods. Collecting tons of waste each time, they prove that civil society possesses both a strong sense of responsibility and environmental awareness. However, if we focus solely on the numbers—such as the more than 350,000 participants mobilized to date by the Let’s Do It! Cyprus campaign—we miss the deeper meaning of this effort.

Our goal is not to become more efficient at collecting trash, but to raise a generation that won’t litter in the first place.

This shift in mindset isn’t achieved through abstract proclamations, but through lived experience. When a child picks up a plastic bottle and witnesses their immediate surroundings transform, the lesson takes root. This educational approach has been embraced for decades in countries like Japan and across the Nordic region, where maintaining public spaces is woven into school life to instill a sense of shared civic duty. If we invest systematically in our children today, a 30-year-old citizen in 2050 won’t need to be lectured on respecting nature. Illegally dumping construction debris in a forest or leaving plastic on a beach will simply be unthinkable.

At the same time, we must be realistic: volunteer cleanups are not a panacea. The uncontrolled dumping of bulky waste and construction debris remains widespread. We cannot continuously rely on volunteers to fill structural gaps, nor can we expect local communities to tackle unchecked behavior without adequate resources or enforcement. For this reason, the state must move beyond ad-hoc support toward institutionalized funding for environmental NGOs that deliver measurable results. Likewise, the business community must stop viewing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a brief PR exercise and start treating it as a strategic, long-term investment in our communities.

Building a new environmental culture requires a unified, cross-sectoral alliance. The state, local municipalities, educational institutions, businesses, and civil society must act in unison. When schools incorporate hands-on environmental education, municipalities provide the necessary waste infrastructure, and businesses contribute meaningful support, volunteerism evolves from a yearly event into a catalyst for lasting social change.

Public space does not belong to “no one”. It belongs to all of us. This year’s Cleanup Week (October 26–November 2, 2026) offers another vital opportunity to demonstrate that environmental stewardship isn’t an abstract ideal, but a daily choice. Ultimately, the future of our environment is truly in our hands #stoxerisou.

*Executive Director of the NGO Together Cyprus

US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio’s visit to Athens was significant in both substance and symbolism.

It was more than another high-level diplomatic visit.

It highlighted the growing importance of Greece as Washington reshapes its strategic priorities. And, by extension, the opportunities and challenges this creates for Cyprus.

To understand its significance, we must consider both Rubio’s address on the Pnyx and his discussions in Athens.

Speaking on the Pnyx, with the Acropolis as his backdrop, Rubio did more than pay tribute to ancient Greek civilisation. He invoked Greece to defend a particular conception of the West, sovereignty and national power. His speech was, in effect, a manifesto for America’s role in the world.

Rubio described a competitive world in which economics, technology, energy, industrial capacity and military strength are interconnected instruments of national strategy. Diplomacy must be backed by hard power.

None of this represents an entirely new departure in US foreign policy. Certain strategic imperatives have endured through Republican and Democratic administrations alike. Preserving American primacy remains a central objective. What changes are the methods.

Rubio also argued that alliances should defend national sovereignty, not extinguish it. A proposition of particular relevance to Cyprus, to which I shall return.

Greece’s strategic value

Washington no longer views Greece exclusively through the prism of its relations with Turkey.

Souda Bay, Alexandroupolis, Greek shipping, energy infrastructure and cooperation across the Eastern Mediterranean give Greece strategic importance beyond its traditional role in NATO.

Rubio described Greece as an “indispensable friend” and an “anchor partner” in American regional strategy. Words matter. Especially in diplomacy.

The sixth US–Greece Strategic Dialogue gave practical expression to that relationship, announcing $4 billion in military sales and deeper cooperation in defence, security, energy and emerging technologies.

Greece is increasingly moving from being a security consumer to a security producer, contributing to regional stability rather than merely relying on others for its security.

That matters. But Washington is not turning its back on Turkey. Ankara remains important to NATO, the Black Sea, the Middle East and wider American strategy.

Washington seeks strong relations with both countries. This is not a zero-sum game.

Preventing war and the limits of deterrence

Rubio’s interview with Alexis Papachelas, published in Kathimerini on 8 October, was particularly revealing.

Asked about a serious crisis involving Turkey, whether in the Aegean or Cyprus, and how Washington might respond, Rubio described such a development as “unthinkable”.

His words carry political weight. They signal American determination to prevent armed conflict between two NATO allies.

But an important distinction must be made.

Preventing war is one thing. Deterring threats, coercion or unilateral faits accomplis is another. Resolving disputes in accordance with international law is something else again.

Rubio’s assurances left questions unanswered. His rejection of a Greek–Turkish war was not accompanied by an equally clear position on how Washington would address the threats and unilateral actions that could precipitate a crisis.

Energy and connectivity: the new geopolitics

Energy was among the most consequential elements of the visit.

The Vertical Gas Corridor, American liquefied natural gas flowing into Europe and the growing involvement of US energy companies are strengthening the regional role of Greece.

Energy is no longer simply commercial. It concerns national security, strategic autonomy and geopolitical influence.

The same applies to electricity interconnections.

The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), linking Greece, Cyprus and eventually Israel, is a case in point.

Rubio reiterated American support for energy infrastructure but avoided publicly confronting Turkish objections to the GSI. At his joint press conference with Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis, he favoured quiet diplomacy over public declarations on sensitive issues. In Kathimerini, he said Washington intended to use “diplomatic efforts to remind all parties how important this is to us and why it matters”.

That indicates American interest. It does not guarantee protection of the project.

Can diplomatic support create the conditions necessary for its implementation?

Connectivity is becoming strategy. But strategy is judged by its execution.

Cyprus: sovereignty, security and strategic value

This brings us back to the principle Rubio articulated on the Pnyx: alliances should defend sovereignty, not abolish it.

Quite right. But what happens when a NATO member and US ally continues, 52 years after its 1974 invasion, to occupy part of another state with which Washington is developing an increasingly close strategic relationship?

For Cyprus, this is not theoretical.

It is existential.

The absence of another war does not erase the Turkish occupation. Preventing war is essential, but cannot substitute for restoring respect for international law.

Gerapetritis explicitly, and rightly, placed Cyprus within the security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean. He called for reunification under United Nations Security Council resolutions and emphasised the Greece–Cyprus–Israel cooperation framework with the US, known as the 3+1.

Rubio did not publicly reiterate these positions in Athens. However, in his message marking the 66th anniversary of Cyprus independence on 1 October, he reaffirmed American support for a bizonal, bicommunal federation consistent with UN Security Council resolutions.

And that matters.

Cyprus also has strategic value of its own. As a member state of the European Union, its geography, infrastructure and partnerships enable it to contribute to regional security, humanitarian operations, energy cooperation and crisis management.

It has already demonstrated, in word and deed, its value as a credible, predictable and dependable partner, facilitating security and humanitarian operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region of vital importance to US interests.

The Republic of Cyprus should not be viewed or treated merely as an extension of the Cyprus question, or as a footnote to US–Turkish relations.

It must be recognised as a subject of the international system in its own right. Not an object of the designs of others.

The challenge for Cyprus is to translate its growing strategic value into stronger security, deeper strategic partnerships and tangible progress towards ending the Turkish occupation and reunifying the country.

Rubio’s visit confirmed the growing strategic importance of Greece and the opportunities emerging across the Eastern Mediterranean. It did not resolve the region’s underlying tensions or guarantee that ambitious infrastructure projects will become reality. Nor was it expected to.

The real test still lies ahead.

*Ambassador (Ad Honorem). Senior Fellow, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia.

Hafez of Shiraz, one of the most distinguished figures of Persian literature, has transcended the boundaries of time, language and geography to become a truly universal figure in world literature. Centuries after his time, his poetry continues to speak to the modern human being through its language of love, beauty, freedom, human dignity and truth, attracting readers and admirers across cultures and generations.

What has made Hafez enduring is not only the beauty and subtlety of his poetry, but also his profound understanding of human nature and life, his criticism of hypocrisy and pretence, his celebration of free thought, and his emphasis on compassion, generosity and tolerance. In this sense, the message of Hafez extends beyond literary heritage; it represents an enduring invitation to mutual understanding, respect and peaceful coexistence among peoples and cultures.

Beyond the boundaries of language and geography, Hafez represents a shared resource for intercultural dialogue. Perhaps today, more than ever, his message of generosity, tolerance, friendship and freedom from prejudice can inspire constructive dialogue among nations. In this regard, universities, research institutions and the media have an important role to play in presenting the cultural heritage of different peoples, bringing societies closer together, and opening new avenues for understanding and intercultural dialogue.

The Republic of Cyprus, with its rich historical and cultural heritage and its distinctive place in the Mediterranean, can provide a valuable setting for such interaction and dialogue between Iran and Europe. Greater familiarity with the literature and thought of Hafez and other outstanding figures of Iranian culture can contribute to strengthening cultural, academic and human ties between the peoples of Iran and Cyprus.

Hafez Day offers an opportunity to celebrate a literary heritage that knows no borders and a vision of humanity that calls for friendship, tolerance, beauty and truth. May this invaluable legacy continue to inspire new generations and contribute to greater dialogue and understanding among cultures and peoples.

With respect and best wishes to the academic, research, cultural and media communities of the Republic of Cyprus, and for the continued strengthening of cultural dialogue and friendly ties between Iran and Cyprus.

Happy Hafez Day.